RETURNING TO ITS ROOTS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
1998 AMENDMENTS TO THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY

DOcTRINE

INTRODUCTION

The entire controversy doctrine is a unique procedural tool
utilized only within New Jersey.' Originally a common-law concept,'
the doctrine later was codified by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
the New Jersey Court Rules.' The underlying goals of the doctrine
have always been judicial efficiency, fairness to all parties with a
material interest, and the encouragement of "the conclusive
determination of a legal controversy." 4 Since its inception, however,
the doctrine has grown into a vast and unwieldy procedure affecting
virtually every facet of litigation.5 Over the past few decades, because
of the • complexity
generated by several New Jersey Supreme Court
• 6
decisions, the doctrine has been the subject of much analysis, both
See Susan Carboni, The Entire Controversy Opinions of 1995 and Attorney
Malpractice: What Price Economy in New Jersey?, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 1273, 1273 (1996)
(citing Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 336, 35051, 662 A.2d 536, 543 (1995)).
2 See Mantell v. International Plastic Harmonica Corp., 141 N.J. Eq. 379,
393, 55
A.2d 250, 258 (1947); Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excavating Corp. v. Northern
States Improvement Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 314, 317, 19 A.2d 48, 50 (1941).
3 See Scott M. Sinins, Comment, The Entire Controversy Doctrine in 1997: Drivingin
the Wrong Direction, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 495, 495 (1997).
The initial
codification of the entire controversy doctrine in the New Jersey Court Rules took
place in 1979. See id. n.1. Each party to an action was required to "assert therein all
claims which he may have against any other party thereto insofar as may be required
by application of the entire controversy doctrine." Id. (quoting N.J. Cr. R. 4:27-1 (b)
(West 1980)). In September 1990, NewJersey Court Rule 4:27-1(b) was replaced by
New Jersey Court Rule 4:30A, which is the court rule presently governing the
doctrine. See PRESSLER, CURRENT N.J. COURT RULES, R. 4:30A cmt. (GANN 1999).
4 Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 431, 696 A.2d 633, 637 (1997).
5 See Carboni, supra note 1, at 1275. In 1994, the New Jersey Supreme Court's
Committee on Civil Practice recommended that the court reexamine the entire
controversy doctrine because the burdens of the multi-party litigations created by the
doctrine outbalanced any benefits. See id. (citing 1994 Report of the Supreme Court
Committee on Civil Practic4 136 N.J. L.J. at 589 (Supp. Feb. 14, 1994)).
6 See, e.g., Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989)
(extending the entire controversy doctrine to include mandatory joinder of parties);
Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 662 A.2d 509
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by the judiciary and by attorneys.' As a result of extreme criticism
from bar associations, attorneys, and even members of the judiciary,
the New Jersey Supreme Court, in the past year and a half, has
diminished considerably the scope of the entire controversy
doctrine.8 Most significantly, the court recently has amended the
court rules to effectively remove mandatory party joinder from the
doctrine in all but the most exceptional circumstances. 9
This Comment analyzes these amendments in order to elucidate
the sources leading to their adoption and to determine their effect
upon the doctrine's continued applicability.
This Comment
demonstrates that the primary motive for these drastic changes was
an attempt to better effectuate the underlying goals from which the
entire controversy doctrine originally developed. Moreover, this
Comment illustrates that the rule amendments were a practical
response to the suffocating reach of the then-applicable doctrine.
Finally, this Comment examines the present state of the doctrine to
illustrate that the doctrine is now better equipped to promote both
judicial economy and fairness to litigants.
The entire controversy doctrine originated when the New Jersey
Constitution of 1947 merged the courts of law and equity.10 At its
early stages, however, the doctrine applied only to multiple claims
involving those already parties to a litigation." In fact, the doctrine
(1995) (holding that the entire controversy doctrine requires that a legal malpractice
action must be brought with the underlying action, even if the attorney is still
representing the party); Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.,
142 N.J. 336, 662 A.2d 536 (1995).
7 See Editorial, Economy, Economy Shalt Thou Follow, N.J. LAW., Mar.
10, 1997, at 6
[hereinafter Economy, Economy].
8
See Olds, 150 N.J. at 443, 696 A.2d at 643 (holding that the entire controversy
doctrine does not apply to legal-malpractice claims, thus overruling Circle Cheurolet);
see also Notices to the Bar, 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Rules of Court: Supreme
Court of New Jersey, N.J. LAw., Aug. 3, 1998, at 1 (illustrating the amendments to the
New Jersey Court Rules).
9 The amendments to New Jersey Court Rule 4:30A and 4:5-1(b) as well as the
adoption of New Jersey Court Rule 4:29-1(b), all of which went into effect on
September 1, 1998, eliminate mandatory party joinder from the entire controversy
doctrine. See PRESSLER, R. 4:30A cmt. (GANN 1999). Also, these amendments
abrogated the preclusion of a second suit against a party not joined in the first suit in
all but those exceptional circumstances that involve both "inexcusable" conduct and
"substantial prejudice" to the party not joined in the first action. See id.
10 See Sinins, supra note 3, at 496; Edwin H. Stern, Symposium, Comments on the
Comments - Reflections on the Presentations Regarding the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28
RUTGERs L.J. 193, 194-95 (1996) (stating that the NewJersey Constitution's merger of
the two courts was to "facilitate and expedite" the adjudication of suits by disposing
of all matters pertaining to a controversy in one trial).
n See Stern, supra note 10, at 195; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Symposium, An
Examination Before and Behind the "EntireControversy"Doctrine,28 RUTGERS L.J. 7, 13-14
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was, more or less, New Jersey's version of res judicata. 2 In 1989,
however, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in an attempt to promote
judicial economy, began its overly extensive application of the entire
controversy doctrine by holding that the doctrine also required the
mandatory joinder of parties."' In 1995, in a quartet of cases decided
concurrently, the New Jersey Supreme Court sacrificed fairness
concerns and further expanded the scope of the doctrine beyond its
practical and workable boundaries. 4 Most controversially, the court,
in Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, held that the
entire controversy doctrine applied to legal malpractice claims, thus
requiring that such claims be brought in the same litigation as the
underlying action. 5
As a result of this quartet of cases, the entire controversy
doctrine fell under heated attack. 6 In response to such criticism, and
recognizing that its decisions in 1995 were not achieving any of the
underlying goals of the doctrine, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
1997, reversed its earlier decision and held that legal malpractice
claims were not within the domain of the entire controversy

(1996). In his decision in Ajamian v. Schlanger,Justice Brennan uses the term "entire
controversy" in reference to claims "between litigants," meaning those already parties
to the suit, not others that should have beenjoined. See id.
1
See Hazard, Jr., supranote 11, at 14 (noting that the entire controversy doctrine
was essentially claim preclusion when it applied only to claims between those already
parties to a litigation).
13 See Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 26, 560 A.2d 1169, 1178
(1989). The NewJersey Supreme Court held that "to the extent possible courts must
determine an entire controversy in a single judicial proceeding and that such a
determination necessarily embraces not only joinder of related claims between the
parties but also joinder of all persons who have a material interest in the
controversy." Id.
14 See, e.g., Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth
Land Title Ins. Co., 142 N.J.
336, 344-45, 662 A.2d 536, 540-41 (1995) (stating that the entire controversy doctrine
bars a second suit brought in NewJersey, even if the first suit was brought in another
jurisdiction); Mystic Isle Dev. Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310, 330, 662 A.2d
523, 533 (1995) (holding that the entire controversy doctrine cannot be subverted by
ensuring that at least one claim in a prior suit is dismissed without prejudice); Circle
Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 291, 662 A.2d 509, 514
(1995) (stating that the entire controversy doctrine requires that legal malpractice
claims must be brought in the same suit as the underlying action); DiTrolio v.
Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 271, 662 A.2d 494, 504 (1995) (holding that the doctrine does
not require a commonality of legal issues, but instead requires related facts).
15 See Circle Chevrolet, 142 N.J. at 291,
662 A.2d at 514.
16 See Editorial, What Goes Around Comes Around - And Then Some, N.J. LAW.,
Mar.
30, 1998, at 6 [hereinafter What Goes Around]. The decision in Circle Chevrolet
touched off a "firestorm" of debate and was "condemned virtually unanimously" in
the legal community. See id.
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doctrine.'" Furthermore, the New Jersey Supreme Court called on its
Committee on Civil Practice to examine the doctrine and
recommend possible revisions." In response to the committee's
proposals,' 9 the court adopted amendments to the New Jersey Court
Rules eliminating mandatory party joinder in all but the most
extreme cases. ° These amendments, which went into effect -on
September 1, 1998, represent one of the court's "most-significant
administrative decisions" to date.'
Because these amendments
temper the stringent and impractical mandatory party-joinder
requirements, the courts of New Jersey are able to more effectively
accomplish the doctrine's primary goals of judicial efficiency and
fairness. In addition, by permitting trial courts to order joinder of
additional parties in limited circumstances, the new rules still allow
for the complete resolution of a controversy.
This Comment analyzes the origin and development of the
entire controversy doctrine as well as its effect upon the recent
amendments to the court rules. This Comment also scrutinizes the
amendments to determine how their application will affect future
litigation. Part I traces the origins of the doctrine and outlines early
decisions defining its underlying goals and parameters. Parts II and
III examine later developments that greatly expanded the doctrine
beyond mere claim joinder to encompass, among other things,
mandatory partyjoinder and legal malpractice claims. As Parts II and
III illustrate, these developments, which were made in an attempt to
achieve efficiency, came at the expense of fairness. Furthermore,
17

See Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 443, 696 A.2d 633, 643 (1997).

See id. at 449, 696 A.2d at 646.
The New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Civil Practice recommended
that the mandatory partyjoinder requirement be eliminated from the entire
controversy doctrine. See Supreme Court Committee Reports: 1998 Report of the Supreme
Court Committee on Civil Practic 151 N.J. L.J. at 696 (Feb. 16, 1998), [hereinafter
Supreme Court Committee Reports]. In its place, the Committee proposed that Rule 4:51(b) (2) be revised to require parties, in the certification accompanying their first
pleading, to identify any party that should be joined in the action. See id. Under the
proposal, the trial court would have the authority to order that notice be given to
those identified parties. See id. The trial court, however, would not have the power
to order the joinder of those parties, according to the committee's
recommendations. See a
18

19

20

See PRESSLER, CURRENT N.J. COURT RULES, R. 4:30A cmt. (GANN 1999) (stating

that partyjoinder should only be ordered for extraordinary purposes); see also supra
note 9 and accompanying text. The new rules also allow trial courts to order the
joinder of additional parties when "the interests of judicial economy and of nonparties" served byjoinder substantially outweigh the interests of the named parties in
notjoining additional parties. PRESSLER, R.4:29-1(b) cmt. (GANN 1999).
See Rocco Cammarere, 1997-98 Supreme Court Ten: Lauyering Issues Dominate,
N.J. LAw., Aug. 17, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Cammarere, 1997-98 Supreme Court Term].

314

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:310

Parts II and III illustrate the widespread criticism incurred by these
modern developments as a result of their failure to accomplish the
primary goals of the doctrine. Finally, Part IV evaluates the court's
pragmatic and logical moves in the past two years to limit the scope of
the doctrine to a manageable size. In particular, Part IV -examines
the catalysts for these recent amendments and their potential effect
upon the manner in which both lawyers and judges deal with the
structure of litigations. Also, Part IV demonstrates that the current
amendments enable the courts to apply the doctrine to better
effectuate both judicial economy and fairness to the interested
parties.
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY
DOCTRINE

The entire controversy doctrine did not begin to achieve its
present prominence until after the ratification of the 1947 New Jersey
Constitution. 22 Prior to the 1947 Constitution, New Jersey's court
system was based upon the English principles of common law and
equity.2- As in the English system, New Jersey's legal apparatus
consisted of two separate courts, the chancery court and the law
court. "

These two courts were independent of one another and

exercised jurisdiction over distinct types of claims. 5 This early court
structure had been attacked as being "'the most antiquated and
intricate that exists in any considerable community of the Englishspeaking people."'2 6
As a result of this segmented construction, the pre-194 7 New
Jersey court system permitted litigants to bring their legal actions in a
piecemeal fashion. Because the two courts exercised such distinct
22

See William J. Volonte, Comment, The Entire Controversy Doctrine: A Novel

Approach to JudicialEfficiency, 12 SETON HALL L. REv. 260, 260 (1982). The "most
direct antecedent" to the entire controversy doctrine is the judicial article of the New
Jersey Constitution of 1947. See id.
See Bruce D. Greenberg & Gary K. Wolinetz, CivilJury T7ials Under the New Jersey
Constitution,N.J. LAw., June 1997, at 31.
24 See id. The New Jersey court system also contained other
specialized courts of
limited jurisdiction, such as the court of oyer and terminer and the prerogative
court. SeeVolonte, supra note 22, at 261 n.6.
25 See-Greenberg & Wolinetz, supra note 23, at 31. Under this
bifurcated legal
system, claims for money damages were tried in the court of law, while claims seeking
equitable relief were litigated in the courts of equity. See id.
26 Madeline Marzano-Lesnevich & Francine Del Vescovo,
The Entire Controversy
with the Entire Controversy Doctrine, N.J. LAW., May 1997, at 16 (quoting Volonte, supra
note 22, at 261 n.6).
2
See Stern, supra note 10, at 194. In fact, because there were several different
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jurisdiction, a party could commence an action for equitable relief in
chancery after losing a suit in law on the same subject matter. 8 This
occurrence could be accomplished without any fear that the second
suit would be barred by the principles of res judicata.2 Thus, it was
courts of limited jurisdiction, a litigant was often required to proceed in two or more
forums concurrently in order to resolve a single case. See Volonte, supra note 22, at
261.
28 See Stern, supra note 10, at 194.
One example of this phenomenon can be
found in Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. New Jersey Rubber Co., in which an insurance
company was able to bring an action in chancery court after the policyholder had
already won a suit for coverage at law. See Commericial Union, 64 N.J. Eq. 338, 51 A.
451 (1902). In that case, NewJersey Rubber had brought an action at law against
Commercial Union to enforce its rights under an insurance policy. See id. at 339-40,
51 A. at 451-52. The court held that the policy was enforceable and that Commercial
Union was obligated to indemnify NewJersey Rubber for its damages. See id. at 340,
51 A. at 452. Subsequently, Commercial Union brought a second suit in chancery
court on the grounds that it had entered into a contract with New Jersey Rubber,
whose acceptance was contingent upon the obtainment of additional insurance
(which NewJersey Rubber had not done). See id. at 341, 51 A. at 452.
The chancery court held that the decision of the court of law did not bar the suit
in equity because there was a distinction between the insurance policy, upon which
the legal judgment was based, and the contract between the parties, which was the
basis for the action in chancery. See id. at 342, 51 A. at 452 (noting that "it is evident
that the contract submitted by the complainant to the court of equity, and that upon
which the defendant sued at law, were totally different affairs"). Therefore, the
principles of res judicata did not prevent a second suit to adjudicate the equitable
issues because the first suit had dealt strictly with the legal aspects of the controversy.
See id. at 341, 51 A. at 452. The opinion stated that a court of equity could hold
that the doctrine of res judicata would not suffer impairment by a
decision that where a matter in pais had acquired a fixed inport at law,
but might have an opposite significance in equity, a judgment that
accorded to such matter its strictly legal consequences would not
control the effect to be given to it by a court of equity.
Id. at 342, 51 A. at 542. This approach to the doctrine of res judicata is much
different from the modern view, which focuses on the facts underlying a cause of
action and not on differing legal theories. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS
§ 24 cmt. a (1982) ("The present trend is to see claim in factual terms and to make it
coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of substantive theories, or
variant forms of relief flowing from those theories .... .").
Based upon this
reasoning, the chancery court held that New Jersey Rubber had defaulted on the
contract, and, therefore, its demurrer should be reversed and remanded. See
Commercial Union, 64 N.J. Eq. at 343-44, 51 A. at 453.
29 See Stern, supra note 10, at 194. The principles of resjudicata, which
include
both claim preclusion and issue preclusion, ordinarily operate to prevent parties
from re-litigating a claim or issue after that claim or issue has been determined in a
previous litigation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17 & 27 (1982).
Under claim preclusion, "[a] judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the
defendant is conclusive, in a subsequent action between them on the same or a
different claim, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its
determination was essential to that judgment." Id. § 17(3). Therefore, "[w]hen a
valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of [either] the defendant [or
the plaintiff], the judgment is generally a bar to a subsequent action on the claim."
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not unusual for a party who had lost an action at law to look to the
court of chancery for a "second bite of the apple."' Often, a party
would file a complaint in the court of chancery even before the
conclusion of the action at law." In fact, in certain instances a party
could bring multiple actions within a single court based on one event
or transaction.3 2 This dual-court structure allowed a litigation to
move back and forth between law and chancery on jurisdictional
grounds, thus causing insufferable delays and inconsistent results. 3

Id. § 17 cmt. b. Under the modern approach, a claim is viewed in "factual terms"
and, therefore, a legal theory will be barred from a second action, regardless of
whether it was raised in the first action, if it is based upon the same transaction or
events, or series of transactions or events, as the first claim. See id. § 24 cmt. a.
According to issue preclusion, "[w] hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the
parties, whether on the same or a different claim." Id § 27. Issue preclusion "is
operative where the second action is between the same persons who were parties to
the prior action, and who were adversaries with respect to the particular issue,
whether the second action is brought by the plaintiff or by the defendant in the
original action." Id. § 27 cmt. a.
so In Knight v. Electric Household Utilities Corp., a party filed an action in chancery
for the reformation of a contract after receiving an adverse judgment at law
regarding the same subject matter. See Knight, 133 N.J. Eq. 87, 89, 30 A.2d 585, 586
(1943). The court held that, "[a]lthough complainant prosecuted his action at law
to judgment, he is not concluded by the judgment from seeking reformation." Id. at
92, 30 A.2d at 588. The court also noted that a second suit could only be barred if
the state where the judgment was rendered had merged legal and equitable
remedies. See id. Because NewJersey at that time had not merged the two systems, a
party could be granted reformation in chancery, even after an adverse judgment at
law. See id.
s1 For a case illustrating this phenomenon, see Nazzarro v. Globe & Republic
Insurance Co. of America, in which a policyholder had sued in an action at law for
recovery under a fire insurance policy. See Nazzarro, 127 N.J. Eq. 279, 281, 12 A.2d
697, 698-99 (1940). During the pendency of the suit at law, the insurance company
brought a suit in chancery to reform the contract. See id., 12 A.2d at 699. The court
held that, "[d]uring the pendency of a suit at law, a supplemental suit in Chancery to
embody in a contract the true arrangement made between the parties does not
stamp a previous law action based on the contract as a choice of remedies that would
bar the Chancery suit." Id. at 282, 12 A.2d at 699.
32 See, e.g., Smith v. Red Top Taxicab Corp., 111 N.J.L. 439, 441, 168 A. 796,
79798 (1933). Prior to the formation of the entire controversy doctrine, it was generally
the rule in New Jersey that, when a negligent act caused both bodily injury and
property damage, a separate cause of action existed for each type of damage. See id.
Therefore, an action at law for -bodily injury resulting from a negligent act did not
bar a second suit at law for property damage, even though the two suits arose out of
the same set of facts. See id.
s3 See Greenberg & Wolinetz, supra note 23, at 31; see, e.g., Nazzarro, 127 N.J. Eq.
279, 12 A.2d 697; Knight, 133 N.J. Eq. 87, 30 A.2d 585.
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Many of these procedural problems were addressed when New
Jersey adopted a new Constitution in 1947. s' Most significantly, and
after a great deal of heated debate, the 1947 Constitution merged law
and equity into a unified judicial structure . 35 Specifically, the new
constitution merged the two separate court systems into one Superior
Court, consisting of a chancery division and a law division, vested with
"original general jurisdiction throughout the state in all causes.

3

6

In

order to facilitate this merger, the judicial article of the new
constitution provides:
Subject to rules of the Supreme Court, the Law Division and the
Chancery Division shall each exercise the powers and functions of
the other division when the ends of justice so require, and legal
and equitable relief shall be granted in any cause so that all
matters in controversy between the parties may be completely
determined 7
In operation, this provision grants to both divisions of the Superior
Court the power to adjudicate all issues, either legal or equitable, and
to grant both legal and equitable relief.3 8 Therefore, once a case has
been properly brought in either division, that court may determine
all issues, legal or equitable, arising out of the controversy.3 9 One of
the primary goals of this merger was to "facilitate and expedite the
hearing of causes by disposing of all matters, whether legal or
equitable, arising in a controversy in one trial and thus avoid multiple
trials of the same case. 40
In restructuring the state courts and
See Vacca v. Stika, 21 N.J. 471, 475, 122 A.2d 619, 621-22 (1956); see also
Marzano-Lesnevich & Del Vescovo, supra note 26, at 16 (stating that "the merger of
law and equity [in the 1947 Constitution] was conceived as a tool of judicial
economy"); Greenberg & Wolinetz, supra note 23, at 31.
35 See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 3, 1 3; see also Greenberg
& Wolinetz, supra note 23, at
31 (noting that the jurisdiction of the chancery division, even under the new
constitution, was primarily over equitable cases).
6 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 3,
2; see also Volonte, supra note 22, at 260-61; Carole
Pasternack, Comment, Victims Once Again: The New Jersey Supreme Court's Unwillingness
to ProvideAll Marital Tort Victims the Right to a jury Trial, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 467,
470 (1997) (observing that "each division [however] retained primary jurisdiction
over those cases which it traditionally heard"). The Superior Court also contains a
third division, the appellate division, which is an intermediate appeals court. See
Volonte, supra note 22, at 261 n.6.
3 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 3,
4 (amended 1983).
M See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 3, 3; Pasternack, supra note 36, at 470.
39 See Sinins, supra note 3, at 498; see also Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 485,
103 A.2d 9, 10 (1954) (noting that the new practice under the 1947 Constitution
allows a litigant to bring all legal claims or defenses in one court).
40 Stern, supra note 10, at 195 (quoting Massari v. Einsiedler,
6 N.J. 303, 307, 78
A.2d 572, 574 (1951)). One of the key factors prompting this change was a reform
movement in New Jersey at the time seeking to eliminate excessive delays,
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removing the artificial and technical barriers, the drafters of the 1947
Constitution focused on creating a more economical, streamlined
procedure for both the individual litigants and the system as a
whole.4
Following the adoption of the 1947 Constitution, the entire
controversy doctrine began to take its modern form. In large part,
the doctrine grew out of decisions in which the New Jersey Supreme
Court was exploring the implications of a unified court system vested
with general jurisdiction. 3 One of the earliest of these cases was
Fleischer v. James Drug Stores, Inc.," in which the New Jersey Supreme
unnecessary technicalities, and multiplicity of actions. See generally Vacca v. Stika, 21
N.J. 471, 122 A.2d 619 (1956) (demonstrating that the 1947 Constitution, as well as
In
the new procedural rules, were only the beginning of this movement).
formulating this unified court system, the framers of the constitution were
attempting to eliminate the shifting of cases between law and equity, on jurisdictional
grounds, without the merits of a claim ever being determined. See O'Neill v.
The chief means of
Vreeland, 6 N.J. 158, 169, 77 A.2d 899, 904 (1951).
accomplishing these goals was the formation of a system that afforded litigants the
opportunity to obtain complete relief in one forum. See Stern, supra note 10, at 194.
Under the 1947 Constitution, however, "actions which formerly were cognizable in
the [c]ourt of [cihancery" would still be brought to the newly created chancery
division. Steiner v. Stein, 2 N.J. 367, 378, 66 A.2d 719, 724 (1949). To accomplish
the goals of efficiency, however, the chancery division is able, once "jurisdiction of
equity has attached," to adjudicate all matters related to a controversy, whether legal
or equitable. Id. Thus, a conclusive determination could be obtained in one court
because the chancery division had the authority to decide legal, as well as equitable,
issues. See id.
4
See Stern, supra note 10, at 195 (postulating that the merger of equity and law
in the 1947 Constitution was intended to "reduce the increasing backlog of cases
pending in the state courts"); see also Ajamian, 14 N.J. at 485, 103 A.2d at 10 (stating
that the reform of the state court system was designed to eliminate delays and
wasteful expense of resources); Marzano-Lesnevich & Del Vescovo, supra note 26, at
16 (offering that the merger of law and equity was intended by the framers to be a
device of judicial economy). By creating divisions that had the authority to hear all
issues relating to a controversy, the 1947 Constitution attempted to reduce the
amount of complaints filed with the courts and more efficiently and quickly
adjudicate those cases actually before the judiciary. See Stern, supra note 10, at 195;
see also Volonte, supra note 22, at 261 n.7. In contrast, because its courts had limited
jurisdiction, the dual system employed by New Jersey prior to the 1947 Constitution
made multiple and fractional litigation on a single controversy a necessity. See id.
See, e.g., Fleischer v. James Drug Stores, Inc., 1 N.J. 138, 62 A.2d 383 (1948).
This case is one of the first instances in which the NewJersey Supreme Court applied
the new principles of jurisdiction to determine the types of claims the chancery
division may hear. See id. at 150, 62 A.2d at 389.
43 See id. at 150-51, 62 A.2d at 389; O'Neill, 6 N.J. at 164-65, 77 A.2d at 901-02;
Steiner, 2 N.J. at 378, 66 A.2d at 724. In many early decisions concerned with judicial
economy and efficiency, the court focused on the constitution's emphasis of the
conclusive determination of a controversy in one litigation. See Massari, 6 N.J. at 30708, 78 A.2d at 574; Ajamian, 14 N.J. at 485, 103 A.2d at 10.
1 N.J. 138, 62 A.2d 383 (1948).
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Court determined that the chancery division, when equitable relief
was not available, could continue to retain jurisdiction and determine
the strictly legal issues of the action.4 In reaching this conclusion,
the court relied solely on the "well settled rule" of common law that
once equity has properly exercised jurisdiction over a case, "it may
retain the cause for all purposes, and proceed to a final
determination of the entire controversy and... settle purely legal
rights and grant legal remedies. " 4
Shortly after its decision in Fleischer, the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in Steiner v. Stein,47 again examined the jurisdiction of the
chancery division, but this time specifically in light of the recent
merger of law and equity."
Notably, Chief Justice Vanderbilt
concluded that the common-law doctrine enunciated in Fleischerhad
been adopted under the 1947 Constitution as well as under the court
See id. at 150, 62 A.2d at 388. In Fleischer, the plaintiff sued in equity,
claiming
the defendant's breach of contract had caused him to suffer damages. See id. at 142,
146, 62 A.2d at 385, 386-87. The plaintiff demanded both specific performance (an
equitable remedy), and compensatory and punitive damages (legal remedies). See id.
at 142, 150, 62 A.2d at 385, 389. The court held, however, that specific performance,
which was the basis for the chancery division's jurisdiction, was not warranted
because there were adequate legal remedies for the plaintiff's injuries. See id. at 150,
62 A.2d at 389.
Id. Prior to the 1947 Constitution, this concept had existed as a common-law
rule. See Mantell v. International Plastic Harmonica Corp., 141 N.J. Eq. 379, 390, 55
A.2d 250, 258 (1947); Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excavating Corp. v. Northern
States Improvement Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 314, 317, 19 A.2d 48, 50 (1941). In Middlesex
Concrete, the court held that, because of "the policy of avoiding a multiplicity of suits,
, . * if equity has rightfully assumed jurisdiction of a cause on any ground, it may
ordinarily proceed to a determination of the entire controversy." Id. Mantell also
reiterates the common-law rule that once equity has "assumed jurisdiction ... it may
ordinarily retain the cause for all purposes, and proceed to a final determination of
the entire controversy, and establish purely legal rights and grant legal remedies."
Mantegl 141 N.J. Eq. at 393, 55 A.2d at 258. Actually, in Fleischer, the New Jersey
Supreme Court based its determination regarding chancery jurisdiction on this
common-law principle as opposed to the newly adopted state constitution. See
Fleischer, 1 N.J. at 150, 62 A.2d at 389. The court articulated, while endorsing the
common-law rule, that its underlying policies are the avoidance of a multiplicity of
suits and the achievement of complete justice of the whole controversy in one
litigation. See id. The court further noted that this rule permits a court to "do
whatever is necessary," within discretion, to achieve a complete determination of an
entire controversy. See id.
47 2 N.J. 367, 66A.2d
719 (1949).
See id. at 373-78, 66 A.2d at 722-24; see also Hazard, Jr., supra note 11, at 11-12.
Hazard notes that the scenario in Steiner was very similar to that in Mantell See id. In
both cases, Hazard explains that the court was determining the appropriate
procedure when the plaintiff was seeking both legal and equitable relief. See id.
Hazard states, however, that the court in Steiner was addressing the problem in the
context of the new state constitution and the New Jersey Rules of Civil Procedure.
See id. at 11.
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rules promulgated to carry out the constitution's mandates.49 As in
Fleischer, the court reiterated the dual principles behind this
procedure - the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and the
efficiency in allowing a single court to have jurisdiction over a whole
controversy to reach complete justice.'O Thus, the court held that
when an action is properly commenced in the chancery division, that
division should retain the action even if all the equitable aspects are
fully disposed of before or during the trial, leaving only legal issues
for determination.5 '
The court's discussion in Steiner centered on the jurisdictional
power that the chancery division was permitted to exercise in
determining the whole controversy, but did not formulate any
joinder and claim requirements for litigants.52 A few years later,
See Steiner, 2 N.J. at 373-74, 66 A.2d at 722. ChiefJustice Vanderbilt noted that
"[t] he Rules of Court are designed to implement the clear purpose of the framers of
the Constitution." Id. at 376, 66 A.2d at 724. With this purpose in mind, the chief
justice determined that (the then-applicable) Rule 3:40-2 "remove[d] any lingering
doubt as to the power and duty of a judge of the Superior Court sitting in the
Chancery Division to give legal relief in appropriate cases." Id. at 377, 66 A.2d at 724.
In reaching this conclusion, ChiefJustice Vanderbilt stated:
It is plain from the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the Rules
that actions which formerly were cognizable in the Court of Chancery
those "maintainable in the Court of Chancery," where the "primary
right or the principal relief sought is equitable" - are now to be
brought in the Chancery Division and, as under the old practice, once
the jurisdiction of equity has attached "it may retain the cause for all
purposes, and proceed to a final determination of the entire
controversy and, except where the jurisdiction of equity depends on
the prior establishment of a right at law, settle purely legal rights and
grant legal remedies."
Id. at 378, 66 A.2d at 724 (quoting FLeischer, 1 N.J. at 150, 62 A.2d at 389).
Specifically, Chief Justice Vanderbilt pointed to the last line of the rule, which states
that " [ i]f the primary right of the plaintiff is equitable or the principal relief sought is
equitable, the action is to be brought in the Chancery Division, even though legal
relief is demanded in addition or as an alternate to equitable relief." Id. at 377, 66
A.2d at 724. The chief justice also explained that, in the chancery system, the
jurisdiction of equity was "tested by the facts existing at the inception of the suit." Id.
at 373, 66 A-2d at 722. The chief justice elaborated that, once it is determined that
the complainant is entitled to equitable relief, "equity's jurisdiction to settle all the
issues, even though purely legal in nature, and to award damages for the breach of a
legal right involved in the suit, will not be defeated by subsequent events which
render equitable relief impracticable or unnecessary or unsuitable." Id.
5
See id
51 See id. at 378, 66 A.2d at 724. Although the court held that the New
Jersey
Constitution and the Court Rules granted the equity division the authority to
adjudicate "the entire controversy," the NewJersey Supreme Court, at the time, was
using that term only in the context of the litigation between immediate parties. See
Hazard, Jr., supra note 11, at 12.
52 See Steiner, 2 N'J. at 374-78, 66 A.2d at 722-24 ("[The court] may, in the exercise
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however, in O'Neill v. Vreeland,3 the New Jersey Supreme Court went
beyond its consideration of the jurisdiction of the chancery and law
divisions and focused on the preclusionary consequences to those
litigants who failed to bring their entire cause of action in one
litigation."
Based on the merger's emphasis on the complete
determination of a controversy, the court held that it is "'quite
impossible for a litigant to go on to trial in one Division of the
Superior Court and then assert, after judgment, a right to be heard,
5 5 Chief Justice Vanderbilt reasoned
except on appeal, in another.0'
that allowing a contrary procedure "would be to revive one of the
worst defects of the old order and to do violence to both the letter
and the spirit of the new Constitution. "- Thus, in barring a
subsequent suit, O'Neill stands as one of the New Jersey Supreme
Court's first decisions to impose the preclusionary limitations
embodied in the present-day entire controversy doctrine.

of a sound discretion, do whatever is necessary to a final adjudication of the entire
controversy between the parties .... ").
5 6 N.J. 158, 77 A.2d 899 (1951).
See id. at 165, 77 A.2d at 902.
55 Id. at 164-65, 77 A.2d at 902 (quoting State ex rel. Wm. Eckelmann,
Inc. v.
Jones, 4 N.J. 374, 383, 72 A.2d 872, 876 (1950)).
Id. at 165, 77 A.2d at 902. Although the law and chancery divisions possess the
same jurisdiction, the court noted that the then-governing court rules provided that
certain actions should still be brought in the chancery division. See id. The chief
justice stated that Rule 3:40-2 requires that "[i]f the primary right of the plaintiff is
equitable or the principal relief sought is equitable, the action is to be brought in the
Chancery Division even though legal relief is demanded in addition or as an
alternate to equitable relief." Id. The chief justice explained that this rule did not
affect the jurisdiction of the two divisions, which "is fixed by the Constitution and can
be altered neither by rule of this Court nor by act of the Legislature." Id. Instead,
the court elaborated that the rule's purpose is to accomplish the constitutional
mandate of a unified court system "without sacrificing the obvious advantages to be
gained by having cases normally tried before judges who are specialized in law or
equity." Id. at 166, 77 A.2d at 902.
See id. at 164-65, 77 A.2d at 901-02; see also Massari v. Einsiedler, 6 N.J. 303, 308,
78 A.2d 572, 574 (1951). Specifically, the O'Neill decision significantly eliminated the
frequently utilized power of litigants to shuttle back and forth between courts
seeking delays or favorable determinations. See ONeil, 6 N.J. at 165-66, 77 A.2d at
902-03. In reaching his conclusion, the chiefjustice reasoned that "[t]he shuttling of
cases from law to equity and back again without affording a party a hearing on the
merits of his case constituted one of the principal evils of our former judicial system
which the Constitution of 1947 and Rule 3:40-3 were designed to obviate." Id. at 169,
77 A.2d at 904. The opinion did point out that when an action is improperly
brought in the chancery or law division, Rule 3:40-3 allows for the action to be
transferred to the proper division upon motion by one of the litigants or by the court
on its own motion. See id. at 166, 77 A.2d at 903. The court, however, also noted that
Rule 3:40-3 provides that an action can only be transferred once. See id.
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Subsequent NewJersey Supreme Court cases further defined the
main precepts and overall scope of the entire controversy doctrine.5 8
These cases focused less on the authority of the respective divisions to
adjudicate a whole controversy, and more on the requirements that
the doctrine imposes on the litigants involved in a case.5 9 In essence,
these early cases articulated the entire controversy doctrine's central
and most-lasting tenet, the mandatory joinder of claims. 60 One of the
early cases to employ the mandatory joinder of claims aspect of the
doctrine was Massari v. Einsiedler," in which the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the doctrine included the mandatory joinder of all
defenses.62 In that case, Einsiedler had brought an action to reform a
contract after a prior action had required its enforcement.6 While
considering whether the second suit was permissible, the court, after
noting other recent decisions, reiterated that the overriding purposes
of the unified court system were to eliminate multiple actions and to
Because the
facilitate the adjudication of the whole controversy.
court rules and the constitution afforded Einsiedler the opportunity
to litigate his defense fully and to obtain equitable relief in the initial
action, the court reasoned that it was mandatory that he raise all
equitable defenses available to him in the original action. 65 Thus, the
See, e.g., Massari,6 N.J. 303, 78 A.2d 572; Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 103
A.2d 9 (1954).
59 See Volonte, supra note 22, at 268. Volonte refers to the entire
controversy
doctrine as consisting of two "related but distinct branches." See id. at 260. The first
branch, which is illustrated in Steiner, gives both the law and chancery divisions the
jurisdictional authority to completely determine a controversy. See id. at 260, 262.
The second branch, which is enunciated in Massari, Ajamian, and several other cases,
"requires all parties to litigation to bring their claims and causes of action in one
proceeding." Id. at 260. Of course, Volonte wrote his article several years before the
entire controversy doctrine was expanded to includejoinder of parties.
60

See id at 265-72.

6 N.J. 303, 78A.2d 572 (1951).
See id. at 313, 78 A.2d at 577.
63 See id. at 306-07, 78 A.2d at 573. According to the facts of the case, the Massaris
had sued Eisiedler in a previous action to recover the unpaid purchase price of a
contract between the parties. See id. at 306, 78 A.2d at 573. Although Einsiedler
admitted the balance due under the original contract, he asserted the defense that
two subsequent contracts had altered the agreement. See id. The trial court,
however, held that the two agreements were inadmissible as evidence to alter the
terms of the original contract, and thus granted the Massaris summaryjudgment. See
id. The appellate division later affirmed this judgment. See id. (citing Massari, 3 N.J.
Super. 40, 65 A.2d 538 (App. Div. 1949)).
See id. at 308-13, 78 A.2d at 574-77; see also Hazard,Jr., supra note 11, at 12. The
NewJersey Supreme Court, in deciding the second suit, considered solely the issue of
whether the first action brought by the Massaris barred the second action by
Einsiedler to reform the contract. See Massari,6 N.J. at 307, 78 A.2d at 574.
65 See Massari,6 N.J. at 313, 78 A.2d at 577.
61
62
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court held that the first suit commenced by Massari was res judicata
to the second suit initiated by Einsiedler.&
In 1954, in the landmark case of Ajamian v. Schlanger,67 the New
Jersey Supreme Court again contemplated the proper scope and
application of the entire controversy doctrine. 9
The Ajamian
decision marked the first time that the court completely articulated
and applied the entire controversy doctrine.
In barring the
plaintiffs second suit based on the same contract as in an earlier
action, 70 Justice Brennan articulated the scope of the doctrine as
follows:
The policy of the new practice contemplates that the Superior
Court litigant not only should initially plead any legal and
equitable claims or defenses, whether or not consistent,
supporting his position in the controversy and seek all legal or
equitable remedies which he may desire, but also, with the aid of
the broad discovery and pretrial procedures by which he may
obtain all the facts material to the positions of both sides, that he
should avail himself of the liberality allowed to form and reform
71
his pleadings and the pretrial order accordingly ....
As a result, a litigant who fails to include in the initial action a claim
or defense, even if it is "new and independent," is barred from
asserting it in a later proceeding.7

See id. The court stated that "[ilt is the cornerstone of our present court
structure that all matters, whether legal or equitable, in a controversy be disposed of
in one suit in one court to the end that a multiplicity of suits may be obviated." Id.
Moreover, the court noted that the old equity precedents would have permitted this
very practice of a second suit. See id. at 309, 78 A.2d at 574; see also Hazard, Jr., supra
note 11, at 12. This decision represented a profound change in pleading
requirements because it transformed an action that, formerly, a defendant could
bring as a separate cause in a subsequent litigation into a mere equitable defense
that had to be pleaded in the original action in order to be maintainable. See
Volonte, supranote 22, at 272.
67 14 N.J. 483, 103 A.2d 9 (1954).
68 SeeSinins, supra note 3, at
499.
69 See Volonte, supranote 22, at 268.
70 The case involved a plaintiff who originally sued for rescission of a contract,
claiming that the defendant had induced his acceptance through fraudulent
misrepresentations. See Ajamian, 14 N.J. at 486, 103 A.2d at 10-11. After receiving an
adverse judgment in that litigation, the plaintiff then brought an action for damages
based on the same contract. See id.
71 Id at 485, 103 A.2d at 10. The court reiterated that "[i]t is a fundamental
objective of this procedural reform to avoid the delays and wasteful expense of the
multiplicity of litigation which results from the splitting of a controversy." Id.
See id. at 488, 103 A.2d at 12. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that
such failure to assert a claim must be viewed "as a deliberate and conscious waiver of
[one's] legal remedy." Id.

324

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:310

While it utilizes similar language to that of Massari, Ajamian is
considered a landmark case because it is uniformly interpreted as
requiring the mandatory joinder of all claims of all parties to a
controversy.7" Although this decision broadly defined the underlying
principles and overall applicability of the entire controversy doctrine,
it also substantially limited the doctrine's scope.7 4 Specifically, Justice
Brennan's opinion contemplated only the entire controversy
"between litigants," meaning only those already parties to the
litigation, not those whom might otherwise have been joined.7 5 Thus,

Justice Brennan's articulation of the doctrine proscribed only the
splitting of a cause of action by those who were joined in the
proceeding, but the justice instituted no requirements for thejoinder
of other potential parties. 6 At this early stage, the entire controversy
doctrine consisted of little more than New Jersey's version of res
Despite this limiting aspect of the Ajamian holding,
judicata."
however, appellate courts swiftly adopted and consistently applied the
refined doctrine. 8 Moreover, the Ajamian decision was employed to
73 See Volonte, supra note 22, at 269; Sinins, supra note 3, at 500; Hazard, Jr., supra

note 11, at 13-14. In fact, commentators have noted several differences between the
two decisions. See Volonte, supra note 22, at 269. Most significantly, it has been
offered that Ajamian focused on claims, while Massaridealt exclusively with defenses;
likewise, it has been noted that Massari barred future proceedings by a defendant,
while Ajamian precluded a plaintiff from bringing a second action on the same
subi4ct. See id.
See Sinins, supranote 3, at 500.
See Ajamian, 14 N.J. at 485, 103 A.2d at 10; see also Hazard,Jr., supra note 11, at
13-14.
76 See Hazard,Jr., supra note 11, at 13-14.
See Sinins, supra note 3, at 498-99; see also supranote 29 and accompanying text
(explaining the principles underlying the doctrine of res judicata, including a
description of both claim preclusion and issue preclusion). According to the general
principles of res judicata, a valid and final judgment between the parties to a
litigation has the effect of barring the plaintiff from bringing a second action based
upon the original claim or any part of that claim.

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

JUDGMENTS § 18(1) (1982); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text (illustrating
the principles of res judicata). Such a judgment also prevents the defendant from
availing himself, in a subsequent litigation, of any defense that he employed, or
could have employed but did not, and any compulsory counterclaim that he failed to
bring. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS §§ 18(2) & 22 (1982). In essence,
resjudicata requires that all parties to a litigation bring all of their claims or defenses
regarding the transaction at issue in one litigation. See Sinins, supra note 3, at 499; see
also supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing the exclusionary effects of res
judicata). For examples of resjudicata principles applied in other jurisdictions, see
generally Roach v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 595 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1979);
Raseyer v. Ramseyer, 569 P.2d 358 (Idaho 1977); Gilbert v. Boak Fish Co., 90 N.W. 767
(Minn. 1902); Wischmann v. Raikes, 97 N.W.2d 551 (Neb. 1959).
78 See Sinins, supra note 3, at 501. Within a year of the Ajamian decision, the
appellate division applied the new doctrine in Silverstein v. Abco Vending Services, Inc.,
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support other holdings designed to make the judicial system more
efficient and consolidated. 79
By 1977, the doctrine's scope included all "the complaints, thirdparty complaints, counterclaims and cross-claims . . . and
amendments to . .. pleadings" in a litigation between parties. 80 In

fact, Judge Pressler, in Wm.BlanchardCo. v. Beach Concrete Co.,8' stated
that "the entire controversy doctrine requires a significantly broader
scope of compulsory claim joinder than is prescribed by the limited
mandatory counterclaim rule.""2 Ultimately, in 1979, the line of cases
establishing the entire controversy doctrine was codified in a rule of
procedure, Rule 4:27-1 (b) .a According to that rule, "[e]ach party to
an action shall assert therein all claims which he may have against any
other party thereto insofar as may be required by the application of
the entire controversy doctrine."8' Because this language once again
made use of the phrase "against any other party," the doctrine
8 5 Moreover, this
essentially remained the doctrine of res judicata.
version managed an effective application of the doctrine's goals,
balancing the desire for judicial economy and complete resolution
against the equally important interest of fairness to litigants. Over
the next few decades, however, the entire controversy doctrine would
experience a series of astounding, and largely impractical,

37 NJ. Super. 439, 449, 117 A.2d 527, 532 (App. Div. 1955), and barred a second
suit. See Sinins, supra note 3, at 501. Later, in Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical
Society, 47 NJ. 92, 93-94, 219 A.2d 505, 506 (1966), the New Jersey Supreme Court
again affirmed the doctrine's goals and principles. See id. ("The piecemeal litigation
of fragments of a single controversy is too evident an evil to remain unchecked,
within present-day philosophies as to the efficient functioning of litigation.").
See Volonte, supranote 22, at 270. The decision was "cited to reinforce the new
pleadings system that allowed contradictory allegations." Id. (citing City of Jersey
City v. Hague, 18 NJ. 584, 587-88, 115 A.2d 8, 9-10 (1955)). Also, the Ajamian
decision was utilized "to consolidate a multi-court lawsuit." Id. (citing Silverstein, 37
NJ. Super. at 439, 117 A.2d at 527). Finally, the Ajamian decision was employed "to
require a plaintiff seeking a prerogative writ to allege other claims." Id. (citing Vacca
v. Stika, 21 N.J. 471, 122 A.2d 609 (1956)).
80 Marzano-Lesnevich & Del Vescovo, supra note 26, at 16.
81 150 NJ. Super. 277, 375 A.2d 675 (App. Div. 1977).
82 Id. at 293, 375 A.2d at 683.
8s See Hazard, Jr., supra note 11, at 17.
Id. (quoting N.J. Ct. R.4:27-1(b) (West 1980)). When Cogdell v. Hospital Center
at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989), extended the entire controversy doctrine
beyond the joinder of all claims between parties to include claims of nonparties, Rule
4:27-1(b) was deleted. See PRESSLER, CURRENT N.J. COURT RULES, R.4:27 cmt. (GANN
1999). The rule was replaced by Rule 4:30A to apply the entire controversy doctrine
to both claims and parties. See id.
SeeHazard,Jr., supra note 11, at 17.
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expansions.6
These expansions seemingly sacrificed fairness to
litigants for practices designed to foster greater efficiency and
economy. Unfortunately, these steps ultimately failed to accomplish
these goals.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF MANDATORY PARTYJOINDER UNDER THE
DOCTRINE

With the adoption of Rule 4:27-1 (b) and various decisions of the
New Jersey Supreme Court, the application of the entire controversy
doctrine expanded so that virtually every legal claim became subject
to its requirements.17 For more than the first thirty years of the
doctrine's existence, however, the NewJersey Supreme Court did not
extend its scope to include the mandatory joinder of parties.8 8 In
fact, in many decisions during that early period, both the lower courts

and the New Jersey Supreme Court specifically rejected such a
notion. s9 For example, in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Gilchrist Bros.,9° the
See, e.g., Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 142 N.J.
336, 662 A.2d 536 (1995); Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142
N.J. 280, 662 A.2d 509 (1995); Cogde/, 116 N.J. at 7, 560 A.2d at 1169.
87 See Sinins, supra note 3, at 503; see, e.g., Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J.
422, 400 A.2d
1189 (1979) (barring a woman's personal injury claim against her ex-husband
because it was not raised in the prior divorce proceeding); Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14
N.J. 483, 103 A.2d 9 (1954); Massari v. Einsiedler, 6 N.J. 303, 78 A.2d 572 (1951).
sa See Ajamian, 14 NJ. at 485-89, 103 A.2d at 10-12 (phrasing the scope of the
doctrine so that it applied only to those already parties to a litigation); Aetna Ins. Co.
v. Gilchrist Bros., 85 N.J. 550, 559-60, 428 A.2d 1254, 1259 (1981) (applying the
indispensable party rule to determine whether a party should be precluded from
brining a second suit).
See Gi/christ 85 N.J. at 558, 428 A.2d at 1258 (holding that the nonjoinder of
claims embodied in the entire controversy doctrine does not automatically apply to
failure to join a person as a party). One notable appellate division rejection of
mandatory party joinder can be found in McFadden v. Turner, decided in 1978. See
McFadden, 159 N.J. Super. 360, 365, 388 A.2d 244, 246 (App. Div. 1978). In this
opinion, written by Judge Pressler, the appellate division examined whether a
plaintiff who has a claim against two possible defendants must join them both in a
single action. See id. at 363, 388 A.2d at 245. First, Judge Pressler noted that,
according to tort-law principles, a plaintiff has two separate causes of action that may
be prosecuted independently when two defendants are jointly and severally liable.
See id. at 364, 388 A.2d at 245-46. Then, the judge went on to discuss whether the
entire controversy doctrine required the plaintiff to sue both tortfeasors in the same
proceeding. See id. at 370-72, 388 A.2d at 249. Judge Pressler noted that allowing this
type of successive litigation runs contrary to the notions of efficiency promoted by
the doctrine. See id. at 371, 388 A.2d at 249. The court, however, believed that
efficiency alone was not a sufficient reason to deny a party access to the judicial
system, especially when there is no prejudice to the opposing party. See id. If such a
mandatory joinder were required, the appellate division opined, it would be better
imposed by the NewJersey Supreme Court through its rule-making power. See id. at
372, 388 A.2d at 249.
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New Jersey Supreme Court held that "the preclusive effect of
nonjoinder of claims arising out of a single dispute or wrong between
the parties may not automatically be applied to a failure to join a
person as a party to the action." 91 The court believed that a blanket
application of mandatory partyjoinder would violate the intent of the
doctrine, which is to prevent an individual who is already a party to a
litigation from
suffering the hardships of multiple, successive
12
proceedings.
In 1984, just three years after the Gilchrist decision,
however, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk,
A. G. 93 foreshadowed a reversal in its position by deciding to
"reconsider the application of the entire controversy doctrine to
parties as well as claims."9 The Crispin court determined that the
doctrine should apply to party joinder in "certain limited
circumstances," without providing concrete, specific guidelines for its
application. 9
Five years later, in 1989, the court definitively extended the
entire controversy doctrine to include the mandatory joinder of
parties.96 In Cogdell v. Medical Center at Orange,97 the court held that
the goal of adjudication of a complete controversy in one judicial
proceeding required "not onlyjoinder of related claims between the
parties but also joinder of all persons who have a material interest in
the controversy."' 9" Failure to join a party with a "material interest,"
Justice Handler explained, would result in preclusion of any future

91
92

85 N.J. 550, 428 A.2d 1254 (1981).
Id. at 558, 428 A.2d at 1258.
See id, at 558-59, 428 A.2d at 1258 (citing McFadden, 159 N.J. Super. at 369-70,

388 A.2d at 248). The court explained that the blanket application of mandatory
partyjoinder "would prevent a non-party from prosecuting its claim or presenting its
defense." Id. at 558, 428 A.2d at 1258.
93 96 N.J. 336, 476 A.2d 250 (1984).
Id. at 343, 476 A.2d at 253.
95 See id.; see also Sinins, supra note 3, at 504. The court elaborated that
when "a
litigant knows of a potentially responsible party, and has already sued that party in
another action, the principles that underlay the entire controversy doctrine should
come into play." Crispin, 96 N.J. at 343, 476 A.2d at 253. The court explained that it
would "proceed on a step-by-step basis recognizing that the doctrine is one ofjudicial
fairness and will be invoked in that spirit." Id. Moreover, the court declined to
impose such a new rule retroactively, and, thus, did not apply it in the present case.
See id,476 A.2d at 254.
See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text (elucidating the New Jersey
Supreme Court's expansion of the doctrine to include mandatory party joinder in
Cogdell v. Medical Centerat Orange).
7 116 N.J. 7, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989).
98 Id. at 26, 560 A.2d at 1178. Furthermore, Justice Handler, authoring the
majority opinion, defined a "material interest" as "one that can affect or be affected
by the judicial outcome of a legal controversy." Id. at 23, 560 A.2d at 1177.
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proceeding against that party for all claims arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions." The opinion, however, did
attempt to qualify this mandatory party-joinder rule by stating that
"[i]ts limits are reached when the joinder would result in significant
unfairness or jeopardy to a clear presentation of the issues and just
result."1°°
In determining that mandatory party joinder had become
necessary to accomplish the underlying goals of the doctrine, the
Cogdell court observed that a "comprehensive and conclusive
determination ofa legal controversy" cannot be accomplished if the
litigants adjudicate their claims in a piecemeal fashion.'O The court
opined that, in the modern era of complex litigation, the goals of
fairness to litigants and judicial economy could not be served without°
a rule requiring the joinder of all parties with a material interest. 0
As a result, the Cogdell court concluded that mandatory party joinder
had become necessary to control "litigational extravagance and
reduce piecemeal litigation."' 3
Although Justice Handler went to lengths to emphasize the
qualified applicability of mandatory partyjoinder, 0 4 the concept grew
to become the central aspect of the doctrine and received blanket

99 See id. at 26-27, 560 A.2d at 1178-79; see also Sinins, supra note
3, at 504.
1oo Cogde, 116 N.J. at 27, 560 A.2d at 1179. The court further elaborated that the
goals of efficiency and judicial economy should not be sought at the sacrifice of
fairness and justice. See id. As a result, any confusion or unfairness caused by
mandatory joinder can be eliminated or minimized through judicial discretion to
excusejoinder or order severance. See id. at 27-28, 560 A.2d at 1179.
101 Id. at 22, 560 A.2d at 1176. The court also noted that "[a] disposition that
reflects only a partial glimpse of the merits, or that results from participation of some
but not all of the ... parties" is insufficient. Id. at 23, 560 A.2d at 1176.
102
See id. at 23-24, 560 A.2d at 1177. The court believed that the advent of
comparative negligence in the field of tort law had made mandatory party joinder
"highly desirable." See id. at 23, 560 A.2d at 1177. The court stated that the modern
litigation explosion has placed immense pressure on the judiciary and has stretched
the ability of the legal system to deal with the multitude of proceedings. See id. at 2324, 560 A.2d at 1177.
103 Id. at 24, 560 A.2d at 1177.
Following the Cogdell opinion, the New Jersey
Supreme Court again amended the court rules to reflect the change in the doctrine.
See Hazard, Jr., supra note 11, at 20-21. The amendment, Rule 4:30A, reads as
follows: "Nonjoinder of claims or parties required to be joined by the entire
controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent
required by the entire controversy doctrine . . . ." PRESSLER, CURRENT N.J. COURT
RULES (GANN 1996). Unfortunately, this codification of the Cogdell holding does little
to clarify the ambiguities that the case left unanswered. See Hazard,Jr., supranote 11,
at 21.
104
See Cogdell 116 N.J. at 27-28, 560 A.2d at 1179; see also Sinins, supra note 3, at
505.
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applicability without regard to fairness considerations.'05 Ultimately,
the Cogdell decision signifies the point at which the entire controversy
doctrine first expanded beyond its effective and manageable
boundaries and began to work contrary to its underlying goals. In an
unnecessary and ineffective attempt to promote efficiency, the
decision reveals the court's apparent willingness to disregard fairness
to litigants. While this application alone was erroneous, subsequent
developments further exacerbated the overexpansion.
III. THE "FOUR HORSEMEN OF THE APOCALYPSE": THE 1995 QUARTET
With the decision in Cogdell, the entire controversy doctrine
arguably had been extended to its outer limits, and perhaps even far
beyond.' 6 In 1994, in response to unfavorable sentiment, the New
Jersey Supreme Court's Civil Practice Committee recommended that
the NewJersey Supreme Court eliminate the mandatory party-joinder
rule that had been created in Cogdell. 1 7 The court, however, refused
to decrease the scope of the doctrine and, thus, rejected the
committee's proposal'08 Instead, in 1995, the New Jersey Supreme
Court handed down a quartet of cases that demonstrated strong
support for the doctrine and illustrated a "solid commitment" to its
continued expansion.1 9 In effect, the quartet was a reexamination of
See, e.g., Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 142 N.J.
336, 662 A.2d 536 (1995); Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142
N.J. 280, 662 A.2d 509 (1995). Much of this is attributable to the fact that thejoinder
rule's preclusionary consequences have aided NewJersey courts in the reduction of
their dockets. See Sinins, supra note 3, at 505; see also Fisher v. Yates Enter. of N.J.,
Inc., 270 N.J. Super. 458, 467, 637 A.2d 546, 551 (App. Div. 1994); Gross v. Cohen
Dufour & Assocs., 273 N.J. Super. 617, 621, 642 A.2d 1074, 1077 (App. Div. 1993).
Another factor contributing to the increased application of mandatory party joinder
is that the Cogdell rule has almost no "contours," which Justice Handler openly
admitted in the opinion. See Hazard, Jr., supra note 11, at 20. This allows for the
"contents and bounds [to] evolve with experience in the course of the exercise of
th[e] Court's regulatory authority." Cogdell, 116 N.J. at 28, 560 A.2d at 1179.
106
See Carboni, supra note 1, at 1275-76.
107 See id. at 1275. The committee believed that the mandatory
party-joinder rule
had failed to accomplish the goals it was adopted to achieve. See id. Instead, the
"burdens imposed by unwieldy, multi-party actions outweighed any benefits, in terms
of fairness and judicial economy, attributable to the doctrine." Id.
105

108 See id. at 1275-76.

See, e.g., Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 142 N.J.
336, 662 A.2d 536 (1995); Mystic Isle Dev. Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310,
662 A.2d 523 (1995); Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J.
280, 662 A.2d 509 (1995); DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 662 A.2d 494 (1995); see
also Carboni, supra note 1, at 1276. The timing of these decisions is also significant
because of their close proximity to the proposal by the Committee on Civil Practice.
See Andrew T. Berry, Symposium, Application of the Entire Controversy Doctrine to
Insurance Coverage Litigation: A Bridge Too Far, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 41, 42 (1996). The
109
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the entire controversy doctrine that resulted in an overwhelming
expansion of its boundaries."" Within the legal community, these
four cases came to be known as the "Four Horseman of the
Apocalypse."'. In sum, the quartet extended the doctrine to apply to
claims with no commonality of legal issues,"' to settled claims
(dismissed with or without prejudice) , to claims partially
adjudicated outside of New Jersey," 4 and, most controversially, to
malpractice claims against the lawyer who initiated the underlying,
earlier action."'
In the first case of the quartet, DiTrolio v. Antiles,"6 the New
Jersey Supreme Court considered the degree of commonality
necessary for distinct claims to be considered essentially a single
controversy." 7 DiTrolio, a doctor, had sued his former employer, a
hospital, and its board of trustees for allegedly blocking his
promotion." 8 Pursuant to an agreement that DiTrolio would be
precluded from suing those defendants again, the case eventually was
settled and dismissed without prejudice."9 Later, DiTrolio brought
suit against four doctors whose alleged misrepresentations had
In determining whether these two claims
influenced the board.2
constituted one controversy, the court stated that the transaction or
series of transactions from which each claim arises must be
Most importantly, the court held that "the entire
considered.
publication of these decisions so quickly after the proposal emphasizes the court's
unfettered commitment to the advancement of the doctrine. See id.
110See Allan R. Stein, Symposium, Foreward, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 1 (1996)
[hereinafter Stein, Foreward].
I Editorials, BarbershopQuartet, N.J. LAw., Aug. 18, 1997, at 6.
112 See DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 271, 662 A.2d at 504 ("The entire controversy doctrine
does not require commonality of legal issues.").
1 See Mystic Isle, 142 N.J. at 333, 662 A.2d at 534 ("In certain circumstances ....
the principles underlying the entire controversy doctrine may mandate that a suit be
barred even though it stems from the dismissal of a prior action without prejudice.").
114 See Mortgagelinq, 142 N.J. at 338, 662 A.2d
at 537 (holding that "when a party
deliberately chooses to fragment litigation by suing certain parties in another
jurisdiction and withholds claims against other parties, a New Jersey court need not
later entertain the claims against the omitted parties if jurisdiction was available in
the first forum").
15 See Circle Chevrolet, 142 N.J. at 291, 662 A.2d
at 514 ("[A] client is under a
double onus to bring the claim not only within the statute of limitations, but also
within the boundaries set by the entire controversy doctrine.").
116 142 N.J. 253, 662 A.2d 494 (1995).
, See id.at 258, 662 A.2d at 497.
"l8 See id.
"9 See id. at 265, 662 A.2d at
501.
12
See id. at 265-66, 662 A.2d at 501.
1
See id. at 267, 662 A.2d at 502.
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controversy doctrine does not require commonality of legal issues."2
The controlling determination, rather, is whether the individual
claims are elements of one larger controversy because of a
commonality of interrelated facts.12 Thus, the court explained that a
core set of facts, and not the legal issues or the parties, will provide
the link between claims against different parties. 2 4 In actuality,
DiTrolio is the least expansive of the quartet and does little more than
reaffirm the existing principles underlying the doctrine. 2 5 One of
the decision's major effects, however, was to force attorneys to be
more cognizant of the doctrine's consequences when planning legal
strategy because the decision effectively removed the6 ability to
deliberately withhold claims or parties for later litigation.
In Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad,17 the second
case of the quartet, the plaintiff attempted to circumvent the
preclusive effect of the doctrine by having one claim in his first action
dismissed without prejudice. 28 Preliminarily, the court commented
that the doctrine's goals of efficiency and prevention of waste of
judicial resources, while less significant, do not become entirely
meaningless when the prior action is concluded before trial.'2 More
DiTroijo, 142 N.J. at 271, 662 A.2d at 504.
See id. In fact, the court recognizes that frequently the same set of facts will
"give rise to discrete causes of action and different kinds of relief." Id. Thus, in the
case at hand, the court barred the second suit because, although the two actions
alleged different theories of recovery, they were based upon the same factual basis.
See id. at 279-80, 662 A.2d at 508; see also Sinins, supra note 3, at 507.
14 See DiTroio, 142 N.J. at 267, 662 A.2d at 502.
Another aspect of this test states
that if parties, after final judgment, will "'have to engage in additional litigation to
conclusively dispose of their respective bundles of rights and liabilities that derive
from a single transaction or related series of transactions, the omitted components of
the dispute or controversy must be regarded as constituting an element of one
mandatory unit of litigation.'" Id at 268, 662 A.2d at 502 (quoting O'Shea v. Amoco
Oil Co., 886 F.2d 584, 590-91 (3d Cir. 1989).
25 See id. at 267, 662 A.2d at 502. The court
repeated that the doctrine has three
main purposes:
(1) complete and final adjudication by avoiding piecemeal
litigation; (2) fairness to all parties; and (3) efficiency, avoidance of waste, and
reduction of delay. See id.
16 See Carboni, supra
note 1, at 1302.
127 142 N.J. 310, 662 A.2d 523 (1995).
128 See id. at 333,
662 A.2d at 535.
1
See id. at 330, 662 A.2d at 533. When a pre-trial litigation has consumed
considerable judicial and legal resources, issues of waste and inefficiency remain
vital. See id. Often, a second litigation will "constitute a waste of resources and an
inefficient administration of justice," even though the substantive claim was not
resolved in the underlying action. Id. at 330, 662 A.2d at 533. In such instances,
"[p]rocedural maneuvering by attorneys that spread-eagle litigation and squanders
judicial resources ostensibly to achieve the best result for a client will only rarely and
fortuitously produce the just and fair result that is the goal of the justice system." Id.
1

123
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significantly, the court stated that dismissal of a claim without
prejudice does not automatically allow a litigant to avoid the
The court
consequences of the entire controversy doctrine. 0
elaborated that in certain situations, such as "where a plaintiff
manipulates the judicial system in order to fragment litigation, the
principles underlying the entire controversy doctrine may require
that a suit be barred even though it stems from the dismissal of a
prior action without prejudice." '' In addition, the court noted that a
dismissal not on the merits will usually only survive the doctrine's
preclusionary effects when the party asserting the new claim had
In essence, the
previously complied with joinder requirements.'
court eliminated a litigant's ability to bypass the entire controversy
dismissed without prejudice or
doctrine by either having a claim
33
before ajudgment on the merits.1

The third of the 1995 decisions, Mortgagelinq Corp. v.
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co.,"" examined the preclusive
effect the entire controversy doctrine affords to an initial litigation
that takes place in a forum other than New Jersey. 35 In the case, the
plaintiff, a mortgage lender, brought suit alleging fraud against
several land purchasers in the Eastern District of Pennsylvaniass
Later, the plaintiff brought a state action arising out of the same facts
in New Jersey against a separate set of defendants.3' The New Jersey
Supreme Court decided that, although the first suit had taken place
outside of New Jersey, the second action was nonetheless barred by
the entire controversy doctrine. In reaching this decision, the court
held that when a plaintiff voluntarily declines to sue certain parties in
an action brought in a foreign jurisdiction, the entire controversy
doctrine bars a subsequent suit in NewJersey against those parties for
at 333, 662 A.2d at 534.
"The entire controversy doctrine does not require that all claims be

130 See id,

1

Id.

adjudicated in one proceeding, it merely requires that a party assert those claims at
the outset." Id. at 332, 662 A.2d at 534. If a party complies with the doctrine's
joinder requirements in the first action, a second suit, based on a claim dismissed
see, e.g., Woodward-Clyde
without prejudice, will generally be allowed. See id,;
Consultants v. Chemical & Pollution Sciences, Inc., 105 N.J. 464, 523 A.2d 131 (1987)
(holding that the entire controversy doctrine does not bar plaintiffs from

reinstituting a claim previously dismissed without prejudice). If a party, however,
fails to abide by joinder requirements in the first proceeding, a second suit is more
likely to be barred. See Mystic Isle, 142 N.J. at 332, 662 A.2d at 534.
See Mystic Isle, 142 N.J. at 331, 662 A.2d at 534.
133 See id. at 330, 662 A.2d at 533.
34 142 N.J. 336, 662 A-2d
536 (1995).
3r, See id at 338, 662 A.2d at 537.
1
See id. at 339-40, 662 A.2d at 538.
137 See id. at 339, 662 A.2d
at 537-38.

1999]

ENTIRE CONTROVERSYDOCTRJNE

333

whom jurisdiction existed in the first forum. 3 ' With this holding,
however, the court emphasized that it was not attempting to impose
the doctrine in other jurisdictions. 9 On the contrary, the court
recognized that it could not require the attorneys of another state to
conform their practices to requirements that exist only in New
Jersey.' 4' Despite this recognition, the New Jersey Supreme Court
determined that it could still require preclusion of any action in New
Jersey courts when a party has4 intentionally refrained from seeking
relief in a foreign jurisdiction. '

Of the 1995 quartet of cases, Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano,
Halleran &

42
Ciesla1
is the most important because of both its

expansive holding and its ultimate consequences for the doctrine.
The main issue of the case was whether the entire controversy
doctrine required that a legal malpractice action against an attorney
be brought in the same case as the underlying action in which an
attorney still represents the client. 4 3 The defendant, Giordano,
Halleran & Ciesla, a law firm, had discovered errors in a contract it
had negotiated for plaintiff Circle Chevrolet. 4 4 Subsequently, the law
,m See id. at 338, 662 A.2d at 537.
See id. ("[W]e do not export our entire controversy doctrine to other
jurisdictions, but merely hold that our notions of procedural fairness do not permit
the claims that could have been brought elsewhere to be brought in NewJersey.").
140 See Mortgagelinq, 142 N.J. at 345, 662 A.2d
541. In reaching this decision, the
court noted that, along with fairness to the parties, one of the precepts of the
doctrine is fairness to the judicial system - namely judicial economy and efficiency.
See id. at 344, 662 A.2d at 540. Because fragmented litigation impacts the judicial
system, as well as the individual litigants, the court believed its holding would
facilitate fairness to the judicial system as a whole. See id. at 344-45, 662 A.2d at 540.
141 See id. at 345, 662 A.2d at 541.
With this decision, the New Jersey Supreme
Court may have gone beyond its powers by creating a rule that violates the Full Faith
and Credit statute. See Stephen B. Burbank, Symposium, Where's the Beef? The
InteturisdictionalEffects of New Jersey's Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 87, 88
(1996). That statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, states: "The records and judicial proceedings
of any court of any such State ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1999). By holding that foreign state proceedings will be
given the same preclusive effect, for purposes of the doctrine, as those of NewJersey,
the New Jersey Supreme Court has given those foreign proceedings a greater
preclusive effect than they would receive in their state of origin. See Burbank, supra,
at 88. While the Full Faith and Credit statute is typically invoked when a state gives
less effect to ajudgment, it does require "the same" full faith and credit to be given.
See id. Thus, the statute also forbids giving a judgment greater effect. See id.
Therefore, by applying the entire controversy doctrine's effects to judgments from
states that have no similarly strict standard, the New Jersey Supreme Court is
violating the Full Faith and Credit statute. See id.
142 142 N.J. 280, 662 A.2d 509 (1995).
139

1
4

See id. at 284-85, 662 A.2d at 511.

See id. at 285-86, 662 A.2d at 511-12.
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firm filed a declaratory judgment action to reform the contract and
receive a refund of the overpayment.' 5 Eventually, a settlement was
reached in the initial action, by which Circle Chevrolet received a
credit for the overpayment, that would be applied to future
payments."
Subsequently, Circle Chevrolet filed a malpractice
action against the defendant law firm, alleging that its negligent legal
make the overpayments and suffer
services caused Circle Chevrolet 4to
7
unnecessary legal fees and costs.
Writing for the majority, Justice Handler initially noted that the
entire controversy doctrine generally applies to constituent claims
arising during the adjudication of the first action, if such claims are
known to the litigant.4 1 In refusing to establish an exception to this
rule for legal malpractice claims, the court held that a client is subject
to a "double onus"; namely, he must bring his legal malpractice claim
within the boundaries of the statute of limitations and the
requirements of the entire controversy doctrine.'4 9 Moreover, the
court imposed an ethical duty on every attorney to advise his clients
that, because of the attorney's negligence, such clients may have a
malpractice action against the attorney. 50 As a limitation on this
l4 See id at 286, 662 A.2d at 511-12. A few months after filing for declaratory
judgment, the law firm withdrew due to a conflict of interest. See id at 287, 662 A.2d
at 512.
14 See id. at 288, 662 A.2d
at 512.
147 See id.

See Circle Chevrolet, 142 N.J. at 290, 662 A.2d at 513.
See id. at 291, 662 A.2d at 514. In malpractice actions, a cause of action accrues
when a client discovers he has "been injured by [the] attorney's mistake, even if the
full implications and damages of that error have not yet been ascertained." Id. at
291, 662 A.2d at 514 (citing Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 494, 621 A.2d 459,
464 (1993)). Thus, if a client learns of the attorney's mistake during the pendency of
the first suit, his cause of action will begin to accrue while the attorney is still
representing him. See id. The court determined that the fact that the client's
attorney is one party potentially responsible for the client's injuries is no reason to
either toll the statute of limitations or violate the mandate against piecemeal
litiLation. See id.
See id. Therefore, an attorney who discovers he "has made a mistake must
immediately notify the client of the mistake as well as the client's right to obtain new
counsel and sue the attorney for negligence." Id. at 292, 662 A.2d at 514. To support
the imposition of this duty, the court cited the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC),
which provide that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
1

149

that client may be materially limited by the ...

lawyer's own interest, unless ...

the

client consents after a full disclosure." Id. at 291-92, 662 A.2d at 514 (quoting RULES
OF

PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.7(b)(2) (1983)).

The court also noted that the

RPCs require that "'[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.'"

Id. at 292, 662 A.2d at 514 (quoting RULES OF PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT Rule l.4(b) (1983)).

By imposing such an obligation, Justice Handler
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application of the doctrine, the justice articulated that the doctrine
does not "bar component claims, [malpractice or otherwise], that are
unknown, unarisen, or unaccrued at the time of the original
action." 5 1
Almost immediately following the publication of the four
decisions, Circle Chevrolet fell under heated attack and set off a
"firestorm of reaction" among attorneys within the State and even
among members of the bench."2 The decision received virtually
unanimous condemnation from all segments of the media and also
created a "cottage industry" for lawyers and scholars attempting to
define its boundaries and application.'
One of the overriding
criticisms of this new extension and its concominant disclosure duty
was that they created an atmosphere in which the attorney-client
54
relationship was constantly on the brink of becoming adversarial.
Moreover, clients were forced into a precarious position that would
bring the added cost of obtaining new counsel, the delay involved in
changing attorneys and tacking on new claims, and most importantly,
the effect of having a former attorney as a defendant.'
Also, once a
determined that the application of the doctrine would not jeopardize the attorneyclient relationship. See id.
151 Id. at 294, 662 A.2d at 515; see also Cafferata v. Peyser,
251 N.J. Super. 256, 260,
597 A.2d 1101, 1103 (App. Div. 1991) ("[lilt is well settled that the [the doctrine]
does not bar transactionally related claims of which a party was unaware during the
pendency of the prior litigation."). According to the discovery rule, a legal
malpractice claim accrues when (1) the client suffers injury or damages; and (2) the
client knows or should know the injury was caused by the negligent legal advice. See
Circle Chevrolet, 142 N.J. at 296, 662 A.2d at 516. Therefore, "accrual of a [legal
malpractice] action occurs when a plaintiff knows or should know the facts
underlying those elements, not necessarily when the plaintiff learns the legal
consequences of those facts." Id.
152 See Rocco Cammarere, joinder Rule Overhaul? Court
Shaping up as Tough Sell N.J.
LAW., Feb. 10, 1997, at 1; see also What Goes Around, supra note 16, at 6. Professor
Allan Stein characterizes the judicial economies of the Circle Chevrolet decision as
"particularly perverse." See Allan R. Stein, Is NewJersey Out on a Limb with the Entire
Controversy Doctrine?, N.J. LAW., Feb. 1997, at 15 [hereinafter Stein, Out on a Limb].
While the plaintiff was precluded by the entire controversy doctrine from suing his
first attorney for providing negligent legal service, he may presumably sue his trial
counsel for failing to include the malpractice claim in the original suit. See id.
153
See Stein, Out on a Limb, supra note 152, at 15. In fact, even members of the
New Jersey Supreme Court's Committee on Civil Practice seemed upset over the
decision. See Marzano-Lesnevich & Del Vescovo, supra note 26, at 16.
154 See Albert L. Cohn & Terri Smith, Symposium, Practice and Malpractice
After
Circle Chevrolet: Some Practical Considerations of the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28
RUTGERS L.J. 79, 84 (1996). In an extended litigation, an attorney may be obliged to
communicate the potential of a malpractice claim to his client on more than one
occasion. See id. Even if the client decides not to pursue the claim, suspicion and
doubt might still taint the attorney-client relationship. See id.
155 See id.
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client decided to join his attorney in the underlying suit, lawyers
feared that already
complex litigation would become entirely
56
unmanageable.

The animated opposition to the Circle Cheurolet holding, as well
as its adverse effects, would eventually become the major impetus
for a widespread reexamination of the application of the entire
controversy doctrine.58 Ironically, the overzealous expansion of the
doctrine, which culminated in these four cases, would be the cause
for an extreme reduction in its present scope. The absence of
fairness to those involved in the judicial process, as well as a
realization that the doctrine was working contrary to its intended
goals, eventually would lead the New Jersey Supreme Court correctly
to limit the applicability of the doctrine. Ultimately, the doctrine
would be revised to resemble the more manageable and effective
version in place prior to the Cogdell decision.
IV. THE 1997 CASES: A SHRINKING OF THE ENTIRE CONTROVERSY
DOCTRINE

The movement within the New Jersey legal community to
eliminate the entire controversy doctrine's application to legal
malpractice claims began almost immediately after the New Jersey
Supreme Court announced its decision in Circle Chevrolet.'59

The

See id. Furthermore, many in the legal community believed that, contrary to
the intent of the entire controversy doctrine, Circle Chevrolet's extension to
malpractice claims would actually increase the number of lawsuits. See id. at 84-85.
1 For example, following the decision, insurance companies providing legal
malpractice insurance reported an increase in the number of malpractice claims
filed, a fact generally attributed to Circle Chevrolet. See Rocco Cammarere, Legal
MalpracticePremiums Plunge, N.J. LAw., Jan. 6, 1997, at 1. Another adverse effect of
the opinion was that clients were paying their counsel enormous amounts for analysis
of the doctrine in order to determine the client's obligations in specific cases. See
Economy, Economy, supra note 7, at 6. As a result, clients were expending huge
amounts of resources without approaching a resolution of the underlying dispute.
See id.
1
See What Goes Around, supra note 16, at 6.
159 See Rocco Cammarere, NapolitanoLeads Fight AgainstJoinder
Rule, N.J. LAW., Jan.
27, 1997, at 3 [hereinafter Cammarere, Napolitano Leads Fight]. At the forefront of
this assault were the State's lawyers, who believed that the ruling placed them at odds
with their clients, thus undermining the effectiveness of the attorney-client
relationship. See Rocco Cammarere, The Leading '97 Legal Stories; A Defining Dozen,
N.J. LAW., Dec. 29, 1997, at 3 [hereinafter Cammarere, The Leading '97 Legal Stories].
Attorneys were angered at the choice the court's holding forced the client to make:
either sue their lawyer while the original case is still ongoing and change counsel, or
waive the claim forever. See id. Attorneys felt that this choice, and the feeling of
distrust it created, drove a wedge between the attorney and the client. See
Cammarere, Napolitano Leads Fight, supra, at 3. Furthermore, attorneys were agitated
16
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majority of the legal profession believed that the 1995 expansion had
failed to achieve any of the goals of the entire controversy doctrine,
especially the promotion of substantial justice.' 6 Voicing their
dissatisfaction, attorneys began a "grassroots" campaign to convince
the New 6Jersey Supreme Court to reverse its decision in Circle
Chevrolet.'
In 1997, the court answered this criticism by deciding a second
quartet of cases, which essentially overruled the extension that
resulted from the Circle Chevrolet decision.
The court set forth its
reasoning for all four of these cases in Olds v. Donnelly,6 in which the
court not only removed legal malpractice claims from the scope of
the doctrine, but also foreshadowed possible further reformation.J

that the ruling exposed them to a greater possibility of liability. See id. Also,
attorneys contended that the decision in Circle Chevrolet, as well as other cases that
expanded the doctrine, sacrificed the substantive rights of clients and notions of
fairness for the sake ofjudicial economy. See Economy, Economy, supra note 7, at 6. In
particular, Cogdell v. Hospital Center at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989), and
Prevratil v. Mohr, 145 N.J. 180, 678 A.2d 243 (1996), have been cited as two other
decisions that emphasized judicial economy at the expense of fairness to the litigants.
See id.
160 See Rocco Cammarere, Argument Today onJoinder
Ruling, N.J. LAw., Feb. 3, 1997,
at 15.
161 See Cammarere, The Leading '97 Legal Stories, supra
note 159, at 3. At the same
time that the legal community pushed for a judicial resolution to the problems
created by the application of the entire controversy doctrine to legal malpractice
claims, efforts were underway to create a legislative alternative.
See Rocco
Cammarere, JoinderRule Under Attack: A Squeeze Play!, N.J. LAw., Mar. 17, 1997, at 1
[hereinafter Cammarere,JoinderRule Under Attack]. To this end, the NewJersey State
Bar Association helped draft legislation that would have created an exception for
legal malpractice claims from the doctrine's mandatory joinder rule. See id.; see also
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:13-4 (West 1997) (illustrating the legal malpractice rule that the
proposed legislation would have amended). In effect, the proposed bill would have
amended the existing legal malpractice statute to simply prohibit the filing of such
claims until after the resolution of the underlying suit. See Cammarere, Joinder Rule
Under Attack, supra, at 1. The bill, which effectively would have overruled Circle
Chevrolet, was intended as a "backstop" in the event that the New Jersey Supreme
Court declined to make changes in the doctrine. See id. At the time it was drafted,
the proposed legislation garnered a great deal of support. See id. Notably, the
legislation had received backing from the Association of Trial Lawyers of AmericaNewJersey, and from most of the NewJersey Senate Judiciary Committee. See id.
162 See, e.g., Harley Davidson Motor Co. v. Advance
Die Casting, Inc., 150 N.J. 489,
696 A.2d 666 (1997); Donohue v. Kuhn, 150 N.J. 484, 696 A.2d 664 (1997);
Karpovich v. Barbarula, 150 N.J. 473, 696 A.2d 659 (1997); Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J.
424, 696 A.2d 633 (1997); see also What Goes Around, supra note 16, at 6. Prior to the
publication of these decisions, many believed that the Supreme Court would use the
quartet to expand the doctrine even further. See Rocco Cammarere, JoinderDoctrine
ExtansionLooms, NJ. LAw., Dec. 30, 1996, at 1.
150 N.J. 424, 696 A.2d 633 (1997).
1f6 See id at 443, 696 A.2d at 643.
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In Ods, the plaintiff retained an attorney to represent him in a
Two days before the
possible medical malpractice action. 65
expiration of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff's attorney
informed the plaintiff that the attorney no longer wanted to
represent him, but that the attorney would prepare and serve on the
defendant doctor a pro se complaint.'6 Although the attorney filed
the complaint properly, his two attempts to serve the doctor failed,
and the plaintiff's case consequently was dismissed for failure to make
timely service.167 The plaintiff, assisted by different counsel, later filed
a legal malpractice claim against his former attorney." At trial, the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in this malpractice69action, and
the appellate division subsequently affirmed the decision.
In reviewing the case, Justice Pollock, writing for the majority,
recognized the widespread criticism directed at the New Jersey
Supreme Court's extension of the entire controversy doctrine to legal
malpractice claims. 70 Further, the Justice acknowledged that such an
expansive application had, in fact, "not fulfilled [the court's]
Specifically, the justice recognized that the
expectations."'' 7'
extension of the doctrine had worked to the detriment of the
attorney-client relationship because it tended to place the two in an
adversarial position.'" Also, the court noted that requiring a client to
join his attorney in the underlying suit risked the potential disclosure
1
16

See id. at 428, 696 A.2d at 636.
See id. at 428-29, 696 A.2d at 636.

167 See id. at 429, 696 A.2d at 636.
1

See id. at 430, 696 A.2d at 636.

See Olds, 150 N.J. at 430-31, 696 A.2d at 637. The appellate division held that
Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 662 A.2d 509 (1995),
did not apply because the legal malpractice claim did not accrue until the dismissal
of Olds's medical malpractice suit. See Ods, 150 N.J. at 431, 696 A.2d at 637 (citing
Olds v. Donnelly, 291 N.J. Super. 222, 232, 677 A.2d 238, 243 (1996)). The New
Jersey Supreme Court agreed with this analysis, holding that the doctrine imposed
no obligations on Olds because the malpractice action did not accrue until the
dismissal of the first suit. See id. at 439, 696 A.2d at 641. The court elaborated that
accrual, for the purposes of the entire controversy doctrine, is similar to that for the
statute of limitations. See id. at 436, 696 A.2d at 639. Thus, accrual does not occur,
for the purposes of the doctrine, until the plaintiff suffers real and substantial
damages. See id. at 439, 696 A.2d at 641. In this case, unlike Circle Chevrolet in which
the economic damages were sustained before the original suit, the requisite damages
occurred only upon dismissal of the underlying action. See id. Thus, even under the
rule imposed by Circle Chevrolet, the entire controversy doctrine would not have
ap lied to Olds's legal malpractice claim. See id.
See Olds, 150 N.J. at 440, 696 A.2d at 641 (citing Hazard, Jr., supra note 11, at
24); Cohn & Smith, supra note 154, at 84.
171
Olds, 150 N.J. at 440, 696 A.2d at 641.
in See id., 696 A.2d at 642.
1
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of attorney-client confidences. 7 ' While the Circle Chevrolet court had
opined that the Rules of Professional Conduct would protect the
disclosure of confidential information, Justice Pollock concluded
that these safeguards were insufficient.
Therefore, the court
concluded that "the risk of the disclosure of privileged information
and the generally adverse effects on attorney-client relationships
outweigh any benefit from requiring a client to assert a malpractice
claim in the pending lawsuit.' 6 As a result, the court held that the
entire controversy doctrine does not compel a plaintiff to assert a
legal malpractice
cause of action during the course of the underlying
77
litigation.
The Olds decision, considered one of the most significant rulings
for the New Jersey legal community in years, did more than simply
remove legal malpractice claims from the scope of the entire
controversy doctrine.'78 More significantly, Olds strongly implied that
See id. at 441, 696 A.2d at 642.
Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 292, 662 A.2d
509, 514 (1995) (citing RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(2) (1983)
(stating that an attorney sued for legal malpractice may reveal privileged information
onil to the extent required to establish a claim or defense)).
See Olds, 150 N.J. at 441, 696 A.2d at 642.
176 Id. at 441-42, 696 A.2d at 642. Despite this holding, Justice
Pollock announced
that, pursuant to the RPCs, attorneys were still under an obligation to inform their
clients when they may have a legal malpractice claim. See id. at 442-43, 696 A.2d at
643 (citing RPC 1.7(b)(2) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by the . . . lawyer's own
interests. . . .")). Although there is no explicit mandate in the RPCs that a lawyer
inform his client of mistakes, Rules 1.4 and 1.7 require that attorneys communicate
with their clients and inform them of the progress of a case. See RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.4 and 1.7 (1983); see also Rocco Cammarere, Don't
Forget That Warning, N.J. LAW., Mar. 16, 1998, at 1; Harvey C. Fischer, Rejoinder on
Joinder: Thou Shalt Confess, N.J. LAw., Nov. 17, 1997, at 1. In 1998, the New Jersey
Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics issued an opinion
explicitly stating that Olds continues to require attorneys to inform clients when the
attorneys have committed legal malpractice, and thus jeopardized the case. See
Cammarere, Don't Forget That Warning, supra,at 1.
177 See Olds, 150 N.J. at 443, 696 A.2d at 643. The
court noted that there is often a
distinction between transactional malpractice and litigation malpractice. See id. at
442, 696 A.2d at 642. Transactional malpractice does not burden the attorney "with
the conflicting roles of advocating on behalf of the client in the underlying litigation
and representing his or her own interests as a defendant." Id. Moreover, in
transactional malpractice, the attorney is a primary tortfeasor, and the damage
resulting from his conduct usually occurs before the commencement of the original
action. See id. Despite this distinction, Justice Pollock determined that a rule
distinguishing between the two types of malpractice would be difficult to administer.
See id., 696 A.2d at 643. Therefore, the court excluded all legal malpractice claims
from the scope of the entire controversy doctrine. See id.
178 See id. at 449, 696 A.2d at 646; Rocco Cammarere, Entire Controversy Doctrine:
High Court Backs Down, N.J. LAW., July 21, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Cammarere, High
173

174 See
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future developments might limit the doctrine even further.'7
Specifically, the New Jersey Supreme Court called upon its
Committee on Civil Practice, which had already appointed a
subcommittee on the doctrine, to examine all aspects of the entire
8
controversy doctrine."'
The court requested that the committee, as
well as members of the bar, make recommendations for additional
modification of the doctrine.' 8 In making this request, the court
recognized the voluminous criticism that had been leveled against
the mandatory party-joinder aspect of the entire controversy
doctrine.' 82 In particular, Justice Pollock noted that the party-joinder
rule had been attacked as prolonging and complicating litigation, 83
as indecipherable by both judges and lawyers,' and as unnecessary to
the assurance of fairness to non-litigants.'85
In addition, after requesting the committee's recommendations,
Justice Pollock commented on the nature of the mandatory joinder
aspect of the doctrine.'8 6 The rule's purpose, the justice explained,
was "not to bar meritorious claims, but to encourage litigants to bring
to the attention of trial courts persons who should be joined in a
8 7
proceeding.'

Moreover, the justice observed that the doctrine's

intent is not to require the ultimate determination, in the course of
one litigation, of all claims against all parties. Instead, the justice
explained that the doctrine's objective calls only for all such claims to
be brought initially in the same action.'88 The key to the mandatory
party-joinder rule,Justice Pollock explained, is to allow the trial court
discretion in determining how to manage all aspects of the
controversy.' 9 Thus, in foreshadowing a change in the structure of
the entire controversy doctrine, Justice Pollock emphasized that the
key elements of mandatory partyjoinder shall remain: (1) notice to
the court of all related aspects of a controversy, and (2)
accompanying discretionary power to manage those aspects.' 90
Court Backs Down].
179 See Olds, 150 N.J. at 449, 696 A.2d at 646;
Cammarere, High Court Backs Down,
suPra note 178, at 1.
See Olds, 150 N.J. at 449, 696 A.2d at 646.
181

See id.

182

See id. at 444-45, 696 A.2d at 643-44.

183

See id.at 444, 696 A.2d at 644 (citing Economy, Economy, supra note 7,at 6).

14

185

186
187

See id. at 445, 696 A.2d at 644 (citing Hazard,Jr., supra note 11, at 7).
See id.(citing Stein, Out on a Limb, supra note 152, at 14).
See Olds, 150 N.J. at 446-49, 696 A.2d at 645-46.
Id. at 447, 696 A.2d at 645.

See id.
189See id.
190 See id.
at 447-48, 696 A.2d at 645.
'8
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The Olds decision, as well as the three other cases, in the 1997
quartet, 19' represented a significant victory for a legal community that
92
had despised and berated the earlier rule created by Circle Chevrolet.
The decision's greatest significance existed beyond its immediate
holding in that it suggested that the court was amenable to even
93
further widespread reformation of the entire controversy doctrine.
The case stands as a pragmatic recognition by the New Jersey
Supreme Court that the entire controversy doctrine had grown so
large and unwieldy that it had begun to act contrary to its stated goals
of efficiency and economy. Moreover, the decision demonstrates a
shift in the importance the court placed on each of the doctrine's
underlying goals.
For years, the court had been gradually
downplaying fairness to litigants in favor of greater judicial economy
and efficiency. The Olds decision, however, signaled that the court
once again had begun to place greater importance on fairness to
The three remaining cases in the 1997 quartet primarily follow the same logic
as Olds and reach a similar conclusion. See Harley Davidson Motor Co. v. Advance
Die Casting, Inc., 150 NJ. 489, 497, 696 A.2d 666, 670 (1997) (applying entire
controversy doctrine to indemnification claim asserted by retailer in products liability
action); Donohue v. Kuhn, 150 N.J. 484, 488, 696 A.2d 664, 666 (1997); Karpovich v.
Barbarula, 150 NJ. 473, 476, 696 A.2d 659, 660 (1997). In Donohue, which involved
another instance of attorney malpractice, the New Jersey Supreme Court simply
stated that, for the reasons discussed in Olds, the entire controversy doctrine no
longer required legal malpractice claims to be brought in the underlying action. See
Donohue, 150 NJ. at 488, 696 A.2d at 666 (citing Olds, 150 NJ. at 428, 696 A.2d at
636). Similarly, in Karpovich, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the doctrine
requires neither notice to the court norjoinder in the underlying action of a legal
malpractice claim. See Karpovich, 150 NJ. at 476, 696 A.2d at 660 (citing Olds, 150
NJ. at 428, 696 A.2d at 636).
Karpovich also notes that, when examining fairness to the individual against
whom the doctrine is being invoked, the court must consider whether the party had
a "fair and reasonable opportunity to have fully litigated [the] claim in the original
action." Id. at 481, 696 A.2d at 663 (quoting Cafferata v. Peyser, 251 N.J. Super. 256,
261, 597 A.2d 1101, 1103 (App. Div. 1991)). Harley Davidson is the only case of the
quartet that does not deal with a legal malpractice action. See Harley Davidson, 150
NJ. at 492-94, 696 A.2d at 668-69. In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that, in products liability cases, claims for indemnification are subject to the
requirements of the entire controversy doctrine. See id. at 497, 696 A.2d at 670. The
court, however, announced that use of a "vouching-in" procedure, whereby a
products liability defendant makes a demand before trial on a potentially liable
person for indemnification, satisfied thejoinder requirements of the doctrine. See id.
at 500, 696 A.2d at 672; see also NJ. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-607(5) (a) (West 1962).
192 See Cammarere, High Court Backs Down, supra
note 178, at 1. Initially, many
believed that the reversal would have numerous immediate benefits, including the
lowering of malpractice premiums, a reduction in the number of malpractice suits,
and a positive effect on attorney-client relationships. See id.
193 See id. In fact, many lawyers believed that the Olds decision indicated that the
doctrine's mandatory partyjoinder rule had been called into question and might
soon be eliminated. See id.
191
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litigants. At the same time, Justice Pollock's emphasis on the court's
discretionary power and the need for notification of all parties
illustrated that complete adjudication of a controversy remained an
important principle of the doctrine as well. Thus, the Olds decision
indicated that the court contemplated an application of the doctrine
that more successfully balanced fairness and judicial economy.
Ultimately, the doctrine would be reshaped to more closely resemble
its form prior to the Cogdell decision, with a few notable additions.
V. THE COMMITTEE'S PROPOSAL AND THE NEWJERSEY SUPREME
COURT'S AMENDMENT

Near the conclusion of the Olds opinion, the New Jersey
Supreme Court observed that the NewJersey State Bar Association, in
arguing its amicus brief before the court, contended that the partyjoinder requirement should be eliminated because it "complicates,
prolongs, and increases the cost of litigation."' '
The court
determined that there was a "wealth of suggestions" regarding the
doctrine, which deserved a great deal of careful consideration.95
With this in mind, Justice Pollock indicated that the court's biennial
review of possible amendments to the court rules, which it was
scheduled to undertake in the following term, provided an excellent
opportunity to examine proposals to modify the doctrine.'9 As a
result, the court called upon its Committee on Civil Practice, which
regularly provided the court with rule modification proposals, to
recommend changes in the doctrine.'97
In fact, the Committee on Civil Practice already had appointed a
subcommittee to study the entire controversy doctrine.'9 8 Following
the court's request, the entire controversy doctrine subcommittee
conducted two meetings at which it examined the partyjoinder rule

1
Olds, 150 N.J. at 444, 696 A.2d at 643-44 (citing Economy, Economy, supra note 7,
at 6). The court also noted that critics believed the doctrine to be too difficult for
both lawyers and judges to understand. See id. at 445, 696 A.2d at 644 (citing Hazard,
Jr., supra note 11, at 7). Furthermore, many in the legal community believed that the
doctrine was unnecessary to prevent unfairness to absent parties. See id. (citing Allan
R. Stein, Symposium, Commentary: Power, Duty and the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28
RuTGERs L.J. 27, 37 (1996) (hereinafter Stein, Commentary]).
195 See Olds, 150 N.J. at 446, 696 A.2d at 644; see also Supreme
Court Committee Reports,
supra note 19, at 697.
See Olds, 150 N.J. at 446, 696 A.2d at 644; see also Supreme Court Committee Reports,
supra note 19, at 696.
See Olds, 150 N.J. at 446, 696 A.2d at 644; see also Supreme Court Committee Reports,
supra note 19, at 696.
198 See Olds, 150 N.J. at 446, 696 A.2d at 644.
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Based on this examination, the subcommittee

suggested to the Committee on Civil Practice that it replace the
compulsory party-joinder requirement then codified in Rule 4:30A. 00
In its place, the subcommittee recommended a series of rule
amendments that would enlarge the obligation of litigants to disclose
to the court and to other parties the identity of potentially liable

persons.'
Furthermore, the subcommittee's rule amendments
would then grant trial courts the authority to require either the
notification of those other parties or, in certain circumstances, the
joinder of those parties.0
While the Committee on Civil Practice
agreed with and adopted the majority of the subcommittee's
recommendations, it concluded that trial courts should have the
power only to require the notification of nonparties, but not their
joinder. 3
Before outlining its proposals, the committee commented that it
unanimously believed that the mandatory party-joinder rule
ultimately had failed to achieve the underlying goals of the entire
controversy doctrine. t Specifically, the committee concluded that
19
200

See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696.
See id.; see also PRESSLER, CURRENT N.J. COURT RULES, Rule 4:30A (GANN 1996).

At the time of the proposals of the subcommittee and committee, Rule 4:30A, which
articulated the entire controversy doctrine, stated the following:
Non-joinder of claims or parties required to be joined by the entire
controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims
to the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine, except as
otherwise provided by R. 4:64-5 (foreclosure actions) and R. 4:67-4(a)
(leave required for counterclaims or cross-claims in summary actions).
Id. (emphasis added to indicate proposed change in rule). Prior to the New Jersey
Supreme Court's extension of the doctrine to nonparties in Cogdell v. Hospital Center
at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989), the entire controversy doctrine was
codified by Rule 4:27-1 (b), which included only claimjoinder. See PRESSLER, R. 4:30A
cmt. (GANN 1996). To respond to the Cogdell decision, Rule 4:27-1(b) was deleted,
and Rule 4:30A, which applied the doctrine to both claims and parties, was added.
See id.
201
See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696-97. Under Rule 4:51(b)(2), litigants were already required to submit to the court with their first
pleading the identity of any party who should be joined in a litigation. See PRESSLER,
R. 4:5-1(b) (2) (GANN 1996).

202 See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note
19, at 696-97.
The
subcommittee's proposed Rule 4:5-1(b) (2) provided that a "court may require notice
of the action to be given to any non-party whose name is disclosed in accordance
with this rule or may compel joinder pursuant to R. 4:29-1(b)." Id. at 697. The
subcommittee's proposed Rule 4:29-1(b) states that a "court on its own motion may
order the joinder of any person subject to service of process whose existence was
disclosed by the notice required by.R. 4:5-1(b)(2)." Id. at 697.
203

See id. at 696.

See id. Citing Ods, the committee noted that the underlying
goals of the entire
controversy doctrine are (1) the promotion of judicial efficiency; (2) the assurance
204
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the joinder rule did not serve the interests of judicial efficiency
because it actually magnified the complexity and cost of litigation. °5
Also, the committee determined that the Cogdell joinder
requirements were not essential to promote fairness to nonparties. °6
For these reasons, the committee concluded that any prejudice
experienced as a result of the non-joinder of interested parties could
more effectively be handled by procedural devices that would not
result in the adverse effects created by the doctrine's mandatory party
joinder. °7
As the main component of this revision, the Committee on Civil
Practice recommended an amendment to Rule 4:5-1(b) (2), which, at
the time, required a certification to be submitted with a party's first
pleading that identified all other parties who should be joined in a
litigation.
The amendment proposal would have expanded the
of fairness to every party with a material interest in a litigation; and (3) the
encouragement of the conclusive determination of a controversy. See Olds v.
Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 431, 696 A.2d 633, 637 (1997); Prevratil v. Mohr, 145 N.J.
180, 187, 678 A.2d 243, 246 (1996); DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267, 662 A.2d
494, 502 (1995).
205 See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696. The rule
caused an
increase in the cost and complexity of litigation for several reasons. See id. First, the
rule compelled attorneys and courts to expend vast amounts of time litigating issues
related to the application of the doctrine itself because the boundaries of the
doctrine never became sufficiently clear. See id.; see also Economy, Economy, supra note
7, at 558 ("[A] lot of effort is going into figuring out what the doctrine actually
requires be done in specific cases.
Clients are paying for analyses of this
transmutative doctrine that do nothing to resolve their underlying dispute.").
Secondly, the compulsory party-joinder rule increased litigation complexity by
encouraging litigants to join parties that would normally be omitted from a
proceeding. See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696; see also Stein,
Out on a Limb, supra note 152, at 14.
206 See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696. Normally,
an
individual who may be remotely or contingently liable will not be joined in an initial
litigation because the litigants believe that complete relief can be granted in their
absence. See id. By forcing the joinder of these persons, the doctrine imposes the
burden of defending an action in which the person otherwise would never have been
sued. See id. Furthermore, even if these parties are later sued in a subsequent action,
they will probably receive greater strategic benefit from the first litigation as opposed
to disadvantages as a result of nonjoinder. See id.; see also Stein, Commentary, supra
note 194, at 33-36. For example, if the plaintiff receives an adverse judgment in the
first action, the absent defendant might be able to assert some adverse finding of fact
or law against the plaintiff through the doctrine of res judicata. See id.; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS §§ 17, 24, & 27 (1982); see also supra notes 29 &

77 and accompanying text (illustrating the general principles contained within the
doctrine of resjudicata).
207 See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note
19, at 696.
208 See id. Rule 4:5-1(b) (2), at the time of the proposal,
required that the
matter in controversy is the subject of any other action pending in any
court or of a pending arbitration proceeding ....

Further, each party
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scope of the certification to include also an identification of any
other party who may be liable "to any party on the basis of the same
transactional facts., 20 9 Moreover, the amendment would have given
trial courts the power to "require notice of the action to be given to
any party whose name is disclosed in accordance with this rule." °
Upon receiving such notice, an individual would then be able to
move for intervention in accordance with Rule 4:33 .21 According to
shall disclose in the certification the names of any other party who should be
joined in the action. Each party shall have a continuing obligation
during the course of the litigation to file and serve on all other parties
and with the court an amended certification if there is a change in the
facts stated in the original certification. The court may compeljoinder
of parties in appropriate circumstances, either upon its own motion or
that of a party.
PRESSLER, CURRENT N.J. COURT RULES, Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) (GANN 1996) (emphasis
added). The purpose of this section, adopted in 1984, was to facilitate the principles
of the entire controversy doctrine. See PRESSLER, R. 4:5-1 cmt. (GANN 1996). The
section is intended to give "notice to all parties in each action that there are other
actions" and parties that may affect their rights. Id.
209 Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696.
The amendment
proposal changes the notification requirement to require that "each party shall
disclose in the certification the names of any non-party who should be joined
pursuant to R. 4:28 or who is subject to joinder pursuant to R. 4:29-1(b) because of
potential liability to any party on the basis of the same transactional facts." Id. The
amendment would still impose an ongoing duty to update the certification when the
identity of further potential parties is discovered. See id.
210 Id. The committee had contemplated automatically requiring notification
of
other potentially liable parties. See id. Because they predicted that this would
become impossible in many situations, the committee instead decided to confer
discretionary power on the trial courts to determine when notice was necessary. See
id. The committee envisioned that trial courts would exercise this power and require
notice whenever they perceived a "genuine risk of prejudice as a result of nonjoinder." Id.; see also What Goes Around, supra note 16, at 6.
211 See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696. At the time
of the
proposal, NewJersey Court Rule 4:33 articulated the requirements for a party to be
entitled to intervention. Rule 4:33-1, setting the requirements for intervention as of
right, stated that
[u]pon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action if the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
the ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is
adequately represented by existing parties.
PRESSLER, R. 4:33-1 (GANN 1996). Rule 4:3-2, enunciating permissive joinder, stated
that
[ulpon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an
action if the claim or defense and the main action have a question of
law or fact in common ....In exercising its discretion the court shall
consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
PRESSLER, R.4:33-2 (GANN 1996).
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this amendment proposal, the mandatory party-joinder rule would be
eliminated in favor of a procedure designed to provide an interested
party who has not yet been joined with both notice of the litigation
and an opportunity to intervene."' Furthermore, existing parties
would have an opportunity to seek the joinder of the absent parties
who had been identified.
The Committee on Civil Practice's proposal also declined to
adopt the subcommittee's suggestion that trial courts be given the
214
The
power to compel joinder of potentially liable parties.
it
idea
because
this
rejected
majority,
overwhelming
by
an
committee,
felt that "any significant risk of prejudice resulting from the
nonjoinder of a potentially liable person can be avoided by giving
such a person notice of the action."2 15 If an interested person is given
notice of the pending suit, and decides not to force intervention, the
committee believed that trial courts should not question his or her
decision. 6
Finally, the Committee on Civil Practice determined that, to
ensure full compliance with the notice requirements of proposed
Rule 4:5-1 (b) (2), trial courts should be given the power to impose
sanctions for violations of the rule.1 7 In determining the appropriate
212

See Supreme Court Committee Report, supra note 19, at 696; What Goes Around, supra

note 16, at 6 ("[The] reason for the disclosure of such non-parties and their
potential notification by court order is to enable such parties to intervene if they
.
consider they may be otherwise prejudiced .
213 See What Goes Around, supra note 16, at 6.
214 See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696. The subcommittee
believed that such a power would implement the New Jersey Supreme Court's
declaration in Olds v. DonneUy that joinder issues should be considered by the trial
court at its discretion. See id.; see also Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 447, 696 A.2d
633, 645 (1997). The subcommittee, however, also realized that the named parties
to the litigation generally should make decisions relating to joinder. See Supreme
Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696. For this reason, the subcommittee's
proposed Rule 4:29-1(b) would have provided that "[t]he court shall not order...
joinder unless it finds for specific reasons stated on the record that the interests of
judicial economy and of non-parties. . . outweigh the interests of the named parties
in not joining additional parties." Id. at 697.
215 Id. at 696. The committee's proposal would delete from Rule 4:5-1(b) (2)
the
existing sentence conferring power on the trial courts to compel joinder in certain
situations. See id.
216 See id.; see also What Goes Around, supra note 16, at 6 ("[T he majority
of the
committee felt that decisions as to joinder generally should be made by the named
parties and by others who receive notice and not by the courts.").
27 See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note
19, at 696. The committee's
proposed rule provided that
[i]f a party fails to comply with its obligations under this rule, the court
may impose an appropriate sanction including dismissal of a successive
action against a party whose existence was not disclosed or the

1999]

ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE

347

sanctions that should be made available to the trial courts, the
committee recalled that Olds v. Donnelly stated that preclusion of a
subsequent action should be employed only as "a remedy of last
resort."" 8' Therefore, the proposed Rule 4:5-1(b)(2) would allow
preclusion as a sanction for failure to identify a party only when the
violation was "egregious and the right of the unnamed party to
defend the successive action has been substantially prejudiced by not
having been joined in the prior action. 2 19 The committee stated that
when these conditions are not present, trial courts should impose a
less stringent penalty.220
In addition to the changes made to Rule 4:5-1 (b) (2), the
committee recommended a revision of Rule 4:30A, which articulates
the tenets of the entire controversy doctrine.22 ' The amendment
simply would delete the language of the rule that extends the scope
of the doctrine to parties.222 Also, the committee's proposal would
make minor technical changes to Rule 4:28-1 (e) and Rule 4:29-1 (a)
so as to correspond to the elimination of mandatory partyjoinder in
Rule 4:30A.22 3
One of the most important effects of the proposal of the
Committee on Civil Practice is that it would have replaced mandatory
party joinder with a far more flexible procedure designed to grant

imposition upon the defaulting party of litigation expenses which
could have been avoided by compliance with this rule.
IL at 697.
218 Id. at 696; see also Olds, 150 N.J. at 446-47, 696 A.2d
at 645 ("Courts must
carefully analyze both fairness to the parties and fairness to the system of judicial
administration before dismissing claims or parties to a suit.") (citation omitted).
219 Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696.
22
See id. As an example, the committee noted that one possible sanction for a
lesser violation could include forcing the violating party to pay those legal expenses
that could have been avoided byjoining the absent party in the first action. See id.
221 See id.; see also supra note 200 and accompanying text (providing the language
of Rule 4:30A at the time of the committee's report).
M See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696. The amendment
would delete the words "or parties" from the phrase "[nion-joinder of claims or
parties required to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in
preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the entire controversy
doctrine." Id.
225 See id.; see also PRESSLER, CURRENT N.J. COURT RuLEs, R. 4:28-1(e)
& 4:29-1(a)
(GANN 1996). The proposal would delete from Rule 4:28-1(e), which articulates the
rule for joinder of persons needed for just adjudication, the language that limited
the rule to the provisions of Rule 4:30A. See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra
note 19, at 696. The proposal would also delete from Rule 4:29-1 (a), which provides
the permissive joinder rule, the language making the rule subject to the entire
controversy doctrine. See id.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:310

litigants substantial discretion. 4 In essence, the proposed changes
would not have completely removed all claim and party-joinder
requirements. 225 Instead, the changes would have given trial courts
more authority to exercise discretion when dismissing a subsequent
case for failure to comply with the doctrine's new notification
requirements.26 Also, by deleting references to Rule 4:30A in Rule
4:29-1(a), the committee's proposal would make the permissive
joinder rule broader in scope. 227
Essentially, this proposal would have returned the entire
controversy doctrine to its pre-Cogdellstate, except for the addition of
the notice requirement. While such a procedure would have
substantially served fairness concerns by placing the structure of
lawsuits primarily in the hands of the interested parties, it would have
done little to promote complete adjudication or judicial efficiency.
Named parties could join the persons they desired, and unnamed
parties would be given substantial opportunity to intervene, but the
trial courts would be essentially powerless to avoid fragmented
litigation. This procedure addressed only one of the principles
outlined by Justice Pollock in the Olds decision, while completely
ignoring the second. The procedure focused on notification to the
trial court, but failed. to incorporate the trial court's need for
discretionary joinder power. While such an application would have
pleased many within the legal community, it would have
unnecessarily dismantled much of the doctrine.
The changes
recommended by the committee did, however, closely resemble many
of the examples outlined by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Olds.2
Thus, it seemed likely at the time that the court would embrace and
adopt at least some portion of the proposal.
In July 1998, about six months after the publication of the
committee's report, the New Jersey Supreme Court released its most
recent amendments to the court rules 2 30 The change in the doctrine
effectuated by these new rules was considered as "one of the most
significant administrative decisions" made by the court in years.231
The justices, after nearly a decade of popular opposition to
224 See Rocco Cammarere, JoinderRule Proposal: Cut Some Slack, N.J. LAW., Feb. 23,

1998, at 1 [hereinafter Cammarere, Cut Some Slack].
225 See id.
226 See id.
227 See id.
228 See id.; see also Olds, 150 N.J. at 446-49, 696 A.2d at 643-44.
M See Cammarere, Cut Some Slack, supra note 224, at 369.
230 See 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1.
231 Cammarere, 1997-98 Supreme Court Term, supra note 21, at 1.
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mandatory party joinder, revised Rules 4:5-1 (b) (2), 4:28-1 (e), 4:291(b), and 4:30A to indicate that subsequent actions will not
automatically be precluded for failure to join a nonparty.2 2 The new
procedure does not eliminate the party-joinder requirement, but
instead makes it much more flexible and subject to the trial court's
discretion. 3 Basically, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted Rule
4:5-1 (b) (2) as proposed by the Committee on Civil Practice, while
also granting trial courts the power to compel joinder, as
234
Moreover, the court set an
recommended by its subcommittee.
even higher standard than that suggested by the committee for the
dismissal of a subsequent action for failure to comply with the
notification requirements.235 In sum, the amendments to the court
rules eliminate the blanket mandatory party-joinder rule from the
entire controversy doctrine, but they do not render the doctrine
devoid of all party-joinder requirements. 236 The resulting application
strikes a workable compromise between the need for complete
adjudication, on the one hand, and judicial economy and fairness to
litigants and nonparties on the other.
First, the New Jersey Supreme Court revised Rule 4:30A, which
enunciates the principles of the entire controversy doctrine, by
removing any reference to parties.23 7 This deletion, along with several
other changes, demonstrates the court's agreement with the
conclusions of the Committee on Civil Practice regarding party
joinder.2l
Most importantly, the revision signifies that the court
eliminated mandatory party joinder from the doctrine and that a
subsequent action will be precluded only under certain extraordinary
circumstances.2 39 The change to Rule 4:30A, however, does not alter
232

See Rocco Cammarere, At Last - A Kinder, GentlerJoinderRule, N.J. LAW., Aug.

10, 1998, at 10 [hereinafter Cammarere, GentlerJoinderRule].
233
234

See id.
See id.; see also supra note 202 and accompanying text (articulating the

subcommittee's proposed changes to R.).
235 See 1998 Amendments to the NewJersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1 (illustrating
the revisions to Rule 4:5-1 (b) (2)).
236 See Cammarere, GentlerJoinderRule, supranote 232, at 10.
237

See 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1.

4:30A now provides the following language:

Non-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy
doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the
extent required by the entire controversy doctrine, except as otherwise
provided by R. 4:64-5 (foreclosure actions) and R. 4:67-4(a) (leave
required for counterclaims or cross-claims in summary actions).
PRESSLER, CURRENT N.J. COURT RuLES, R. 4:30A (GANN 1996).
238 See PRESSLER, R. 4:30A cmt. (GANN 1999).
2s9 See id.

Rule
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the doctrine's application to claims.240 The doctrine still requires
parties to a litigation to bring all aspects of a controversy in one single
proceeding or suffer preclusion of unjoined claims in a second suit.241
Second, the New Jersey Supreme Court revised Rule 4:5-1(b) (2)
to significantly enlarge the disclosure obligations of litigants and to
increase the array of responses available to trial courts for failure to
fulfill those obligations.2
The purpose of these expanded
requirements is to replace the ineffective party-joinder requirement
with a rule more appropriate for accomplishing the doctrine's
original goals.243 Essentially, the court's amendment to Rule 4:51(b) (2) adopts a majority of the suggestions made by the Committee
on Civil Practice.2 " Specifically, the new rule requires every party to
an action to disclose the identity of any nonparties who ought to be
joined "because of potential liability to any party on the basis of the
same transactional facts. ''2 45 Like the committee's proposal, the new
rule also confers on trial courts the authority to order notice of the
See id.
See id.; see also Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 485, 103 A.2d 9, 10 (1954)
(holding that the entire controversy doctrine demanded that all legal and equitable
claims relating to a controversy be brought in one action); Massari v. Einsiedler, 6
N.J. 303, 313, 78 A.2d 572, 577 (1951) (holding that the entire controversy doctrine
requires all equitable defenses to be pleaded in an initial action or be barred from
being litigated in a successive action); Marzano-Lesnevich & Del Vescovo, supra note
26, at 16 (stating that the doctrine's scope includes all the claims, third-party claims,
counterclaims, and cross-claims between parties to a litigation).
242 See PRESSLER, R. 4:30A cmt. (GANN 1999).
245 See PRESSLER, R 4:5-1 (b) (2) cmt. (GANN 1999); see also Olds v. Donnelly, 150
240

241

N.J. 424, 431, 696 A.2d 633, 637 (1997) ("The goals of the doctrine are to promote
judicial efficiency, assure fairness to all parties with a material interest in an action,
and encourage the conclusive determination of a legal controversy.").
2
See 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1; see also
Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696; supra notes 208-10 and
accompanying text (discussing the rule changes suggested by the committee).
245

1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1; see also

PRESSLER, R. 4:5-1 (b) (2) (GANN 1999); Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19,
at 696; supra text accompanying notes 208-10 (outlining the suggestions of the
committee). Essentially, the new rule requires the identification of all individuals
who are not parties but whose joinder would have been required under the entire
controversy doctrine. PRESSLER, R. 4:5-1(b)(2) cmt. (GANN 1999).
This group
includes all those people who would be subject tojoinder under Rule 4:28 and those
subject to permissive joinder under Rule 4:29-1(b). See id. The language employed
by the New Jersey Supreme Court's amendment utilizes virtually identical language
to that used in the committee's proposal and conveys the same meaning. See Supreme
Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696. As with the prior Rule 4:5-1 (b) (2), the
identification of these individuals is made in the certification that Rule 4:5-1 requires
every litigant to include with his or her first pleading. See PRESSLER, R. 4:5-1(b) (2)
(GANN 1999) (retaining the same requirement as the rule had prior to the
amendments in 1998).
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action be made to any person identified. 4 6 This amendment closely
mirrors Justice Pollock's emphasis on notification to the court of all
aspects of a controversy as a main principle of the doctrine. Contrary
to the committee's suggestion, however, Rule 4:5-1 (b) (2) also grants
trial courts the ability to compel the joinder of those persons
identified in the certification. 7 By granting trial courts the authority
to order joinder, the New Jersey Supreme Court seemingly agreed
with the subcommittee's belief that such power advanced the second
of Justice Pollock's mandates in Olds v. Donnelly, namely, that courts
should have the ability to exercise discretion regarding joinder
issues.
The structure and scope of an action, however, is best
shaped by the parties themselves and the interested nonparties
because they bear the cost and stress of litigation.24 9 Therefore, when
the parties choose not to join a nonparties, and the notified
nonparties chooses not to intervene, trial courts should exercise their
joinder authority sparingly.50
In revising Rule 4:5-1 (b) (2), the New Jersey Supreme Court also
addressed the issue of sanctions for failure to comply with the
notification requirements, in line with the recommendations of the
Committee on Civil Practice.'
Paralleling the committee's proposal,
the new rule provides that trial courts may impose appropriate
sanctions, including dismissal of a subsequent action, when a party
fails to comply with its notification obligation under Rule 4:51 (b) (2) .2 Moreover, the amended rule, like the proposal, stresses
246

See 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1. Factors

for determining whether the court should require notice be given to nonparties
include privity between the parties and nonparties and the indemnitor status of the
nonparties. See PRESSLER, R_ 4:5-1(b) (2) cmt. (GANN 1999); see, e.g., Harley Davidson
Motor Co.v. Advance Die Casting, Inc., 150 N.J. 489, 696 A.2d 666 (1997).
247 See 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Rules
of Court, supra note 8, at 1. The
standard to be employed for compelling joinder is articulated in the comment to
Rule 4:29-1(b). See PRESSLER, R. 4:5-1 (b) (2) cmt. (GANN 1999). For joinder to be
warranted, there must be a finding that "the interests of both judicial economy and
of the non-parties to be served by joinder substantially outweigh the interests of the
named parties in not joining additional parties." Id.
24
See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696; see also Olds, 150 N.J. at
447, 696 A.2d at 645 ("[T]he point is to require submission of issues concerning
joinder to the discretion of the trial court, which then can decide how best to
manage them."); see also Cammarere, GentlerJoinderRule, supra note 232, at 10.
See PRESSLER, R. 4:5-1(b) (2) cmt. (GANN 1999); see also Supreme Court Committee
Reports, supranote 19, at 696.
See PRESSLER, R. 4:5-1 (b) (2) cmt.(GANN 1999).
25 See 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Rules of Court,
supra note 8, at 1; see also
Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696.
52 See 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1; see also
Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696. The new rule also states that
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that the dismissal of a subsequent litigation is an extreme remedy that
should be used only under extraordinary circumstances. 52
The
language adopted by the rule amendment, however, seems to set a
higher standard for dismissal than that articulated in the committee's
proposal. 54 The committee's proposal states that a subsequent action
should not be dismissed for noncompliance unless the failure to
comply is "egregious and the right of the unnamed party to defend
the successive action has been substantially prejudiced by not having
been joined in the prior action." 55 The language actually adopted by
the NewJersey Supreme Court in the rule amendment substitutes the
word "egregious" with the word "inexcusable. 256
Because
"inexcusable" carries a stronger connotation than does "egregious,"
this slight change in phraseology suggests that the court believed the
already high standard for dismissal suggested by the committee was
not sufficient to restrict the use of the sanction. 5 7

one appropriate sanction is "the imposition on the noncomplying party of litigation
expenses that could have been avoided by compliance with this rule." 1998
Amendments to the NewJersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1.
255 See id.; Supreme Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696.
254 See 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey
Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1; Supreme
Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696.
255 Id. at 696.
The subcommittee believed that this standard promoted the
principle stated in Olds, 150 N.J. at 446, 696 A.2d at 645, that the remedy of
preclusion should be used as a last resort.
2
See 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1.
In
referring to the possible degree of sanctions, the amended Rule 4:5-1(b) (2) provides,
in its entirety:
If a party fails to comply with its obligations under this rule, the court
may impose an appropriate sanction including dismissal of a successive
action against a party whose existence was not disclosed .

.

.

. A

successive action shall not, however, be dismissed for failure of
compliance with this rule unless the failure of compliance was
inexcusable and the right of the undisclosed party to defend the
successive action has been substantially prejudiced by not having been
identified in the prior action.
PRESSLER, R.4:5-1(b) (2) (GANN 1999) (emphasis added). Moreover, the amendment
deleted language present in the rule's prior form, which stated that "[t]he court may
compel the joinder of parties in appropriate circumstances, either upon its own
motion or that of a party." 1998 Amendments to the New Rules of Court, supra note 8, at
1; see alsoPRESSLER, R. 4:5-1 (b) (2) (GANN 1996).
257 See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 398 & 618
(9th ed. 1983)
[hereinafter WEBSTER'S NINTH]; see also Cammarere, Gentler Joinder Rule, supra note
232, at 1830 (" [T]he inexcusable standard is a high one - probably not intended by
the Circle Chevrolet line of cases."). Webster's defines the word "egregious" as
conspicuously bad or flagrant. See WEBSTER'S NINTH, supra, at 398. The dictionary
defines the word "inexcusable" as acting without any excuse orjustification. See id. at
618.
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A third rule that the court revised to alter the scope and
application of the entire controversy doctrine is Rule 4:29-1(b).258
Paragraph (b) of this rule was adopted in conjunction with the other
rules in order to vest the trial court with thejoinder power articulated
in the amended Rule 4:5-1 (b) (2) .259 As was noted earlier, the
Committee on Civil Practice did not recommend, and even explicitly
rejected, the grant of authority conferred by this rule.260 The New
Jersey Supreme Court, however, endorsed the entire controversy
doctrine subcommittee's determination that trial courts should be
26,
In
able to exercise their discretion in joinder determinations.
effect, the new rule gives trial courts the ability to order thejoinder of
nonparties identified in a Rule 4:5-1 (b) (2) certification or in any
other manner.262 In line with the court's mandate in Olds v.
Donnelly, 3 however, Rule 4:29-1(b) allows a trial court to order
joinder only under extraordinary circumstances. 26 The rule grants a
trial court the authority to order joinder only upon a finding that
"the interests of judicial economy and of non-parties which would be
served by such joinder substantially outweigh the interests of the
named parties in notjoining additional parties., 265 Therefore, when a
court orders joinder of a nonparties for reasons grounded in the
entire controversy doctrine, it must do so in compliance with the
specific standards defined by Rule 4:29-1 (b), and not by the broad
4:30.26
discretionary power formerly granted by Rule

See 1998 Amendments to the NewJersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1.
See PRESSLER, R. 4:29-1(b) cmt. (GANN 1999).
260 See Supreme Court Committee Reports, supranote
19, at 696.
258
259

261

See id.

See PRESSLER, R. 4:29-1(b) cmt. (GANN 1999); see also 1998 Amendments to the New
Jersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1. The new paragraph provides that "[t]he court
on its own motion may order the joinder of any person subject to service of process
whose existence was disclosed by the notice required by Rule 4:5-1(b) (2) or by any
other means who may be liable to any party on the basis of the same transactional
facts." PRESSLER, R. 4:29-1(b) (GANN 1999). This section did not exist in any form
before the amendments made in 1998. See PRESSLER, R. 4:29-1(b) cmt. (GANN 1999).
The original paragraph (b), which dealt with joinder in certain tax foreclosure and
condemnation actions, was redesignated as paragraph (c) when this new provision
was adopted. SeePRESSLER, R. 4:29-1(c) cmt. (GANN 1999).
263 See Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 446, 696 A.2d
633, 644 (1997).
2C See PRESSLER, R. 4:29-1(b) (GANN
1999).
262

265

Id.

266

See PRESSLER, R. 4:29-1(b) cmt. (GANN 1999). Rule 4:30, which enunciates the

rule for misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties, provides that "[m] isjoinder of parties
is not grounds for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by court
order on motion by any party or its own motion. Any claim against a party may be
reserved or severed and proceeded with separately by court order." PRESSLER, R.4:30
(GANN 1999). This rule grants trial courts general discretion to order joinder of
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The final rule amendment enacted revised Rule 4:28-1 (e), which
had articulated the rule for joinder of those parties needed for just
adjudication. 267 Essentially, the amendment deleted a phrase stating
that the rule was subject to the principles of Rule 4:30A and the
entire controversy doctrine. 26 The deletion was basically a technical
revision meant to correspond to the elimination of mandatory party
joinder from the doctrine.2 69 The deletion is significant, however,
because it illustrates that, with this set of revisions, the entire
controversy doctrine has come full circle from its2 7days
before the
0
extension made in Cogdell v. Hospital Center at Orange.
As discussed earlier, the impetus for this set of rule amendments,
which so drastically altered the doctrine, was the NewJersey Supreme
Court's decision in Olds.27' Although the court had called specifically
upon the Committee on Civil Practice to make recommendations for
restructuring the doctrine, its actual amendments only partially adopt
the committee's suggestions.2 7 By integrating the suggestions of both
the committee and the subcommittee, the court illustrated its
commitment to what it believed to be the principles behind the
mandatory partyjoinder rule: notice to all potential parties and the
managerial discretion of trial courts.7
The inclusion of the
subcommittee's recommended party-joinder authority demonstrates
the court's commitment to allowing trial courts broad power to fully
litigate the controversies before them.2 74 The procedure that results
from these decisions is far more relaxed than that created by such
decisions as Circle Chevrolet and Cogdell. The procedure illustrates the
New Jersey Supreme Court's commitment to address the fairness
nonparties. See PRESSLER, R. 4:30 cmt. (GANN 1999). With the adoption of Rule 4:291(b), however, this general discretionary authority is limited to the extent that
joinder must comply with its more specific standards. See id.; PRESSLER, R. 4:29-1(b)
cmt. (GANN 1999).
27

See 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1;

Cammarere, 1997-98 Supreme Court Term, supranote 21, at 1.
268

See 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1; see also

PRESSLER, R. 4:28-1(e) cmt. (GANN 1999).
269 See PRESSLER, R. 4:28-1(e) cmt. (GANN 1999).
270

See id.; Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 26, 560 A.2d 1169, 1178

(1989).
271 See Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 449, 696 A.2d 633, 646 (1997); see also supra
notes 178-85 and accompanying text (discussing the court's decision in Olds).
272 See 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Rules of Court, supra note 8, at 1; Supreme
Court Committee Reports, supra note 19, at 696-97.
273 See Olds, 150 NJ. at 447-48, 696 A.2d at 645 (announcing
that the two
underpinnings of the party-joinder rule are the trial court's discretionary authority to
manage the proceeding and notice to all those with a material interest).
274 See id.; Cammarere, GentlerJoinderRule, supra note 232, at 10.
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concerns of the interested parties, while still striving for a higher
degree of efficiency and economy than that provided by traditional
procedural mechanisms.
The final result represents possibly the best compromise by a
court that seems unwilling to eliminate completely the partyjoinder
aspects of the doctrine. The doctrine is now much more flexible and,
unlike the prior version, seems designed to handle the circumstances
of each particular case. Contrary to earlier periods, this application
will not require attorneys to spend large amounts of their time and
their client's money determining how thejoinder requirements apply
to a specific case. The present rules allow parties to structure lawsuits
according to their desires and then simply to identify all related
individuals. The language allowing trial courts to order joinder and
preclude subsequent suits, however, is fairly vague. Even though the
provisions seem to set particularly high standards for these actions,
the frequency of their use will depend highly on judicial
interpretation. If courts frequently implement these actions, many of
the flaws of the former procedure could resurface. In light of the
court's emphasis on the deference given to the litigants' decision,
however, this seems unlikely to happen. The result is a practical
restructuring of the doctrine, which seems tailored to accomplish its
best goals, while avoiding its most severe pitfalls.
CONCLUSION

The entire controversy doctrine, including its various
expansions, represents a bold and courageous experiment by the
NewJersey Supreme Court. Even in its most overreaching form, the
entire controversy doctrine was intended to accomplish noble goals. 5
Although many of the doctrine's applications ultimately proved
impractical and unsuccessful, the development of the doctrine
illustrates that its magnitude and usefulness as a procedural device
exists in these underlying principles.
An examination of the
doctrine's history reveals that, in its earliest form, it had forsaken
substantial judicial efficiency to accommodate fairness issues by
allowing litigants considerable freedom in structuring lawsuits.
Subsequent modifications of the doctrine, however, virtually
eliminated fairness as an objective in an attempt to ensure the
complete adjudication of a controversy in one proceeding. While
these main goals have been continually identified as the impetus
275

As the NewJersey Supreme Court iterated in Olds v. Donnelly, the main goals of

the entire controversy doctrine were fairness to the litigants, judicial efficiency, and
the complete adjudication of a controversy. See Olds, 150 N.J. at 431, 696 A.2d at 637.
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behind the extension of the doctrine's application, the more recent
enlargements of the doctrine actually have worked contrary to these
goals. The latest amendments, in contrast, have once again placed
significant emphasis on facilitating fairness towards litigants.
Moreover, the resultant changes have molded the doctrine into an
application that seems more adept at addressing fairness, efficiency,
and the complete adjudication of controversies. The amendments
have accomplished this by creating a more flexible procedure that
gives all interested parties notice of and an opportunity to intervene
into a litigation. At the same time, these amendments vest the trial
courts with limited authority to orderjoinder of parties.
Since the doctrine's origins in the 1947 merger of law and
equity, it has been designed to avoid the evils of an ancient judicial
system that routinely fostered inefficient proceedings and
inconsistent results. 76 The doctrine's early forms centered on the
complete adjudication of controversies and the avoidance of
fragmented litigation. 77 The doctrine's ability to accomplish its own
goals was limited, however, because it focused solely on the named
parties in a proceeding. While the earliest form of the doctrine
defeated many of the problems associated with the former dual-court
system, it still afforded litigants substantial control over the structure
of their disputes and permitted them to fragment claims against
different parties. Thus, the original incarnation of the doctrine,
while addressing efficiency issues, gave substantial weight to the
fairness concerns, particularly the principle of affording the parties to
a lawsuit discretionary power over its size and focus. At its earliest
stages, therefore, the doctrine sacrificed considerable judicial
efficiency and economy in order to accommodate the fairness
notions of party autonomy within a litigation.
As the doctrine developed, however, the New Jersey Supreme
Court began to take a position that attempted to maximize judicial
efficiency and economy, sometimes to the detriment of the actual
litigants in a proceeding. This position was first evident in Cogdell in
which the court held that fragmentation of litigation and the waste of
judicial resources could not be avoided without a mandatory partyjoinder rule.2 78 This expansion of the doctrine signals the point at
See, e.g., Knight v. Electric Household Util. Corp., 133 N.J. Eq. 87, 30 A.2d 585
(1943); Nazzarro v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co. of Am., 127 N.J. Eq. 279, 12 A.2d 697
(1940); Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. NewJersey Rubber Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 338,
276

51 A. 451 (1902).

See Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 485, 103 A.2d 9, 10 (1954); Massari v.
Einsiedler, 6 N.J. 303, 307-08, 78 A.2d 572, 574 (1951).
278 See Cogdell v. Medical Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J.
7, 26, 560 A.2d 1169, 1178
27
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which the court began to back away from fairness principles in
general. In particular, Cogdell demonstrates the court's abandonment
of the notion of party autonomy. The 1995 quartet, particularly the
doctrine's extension to legal malpractice claims, exhibited the
extreme of the court's disregard of fairness issues in favor of judicial
efficiency.'" Not only did the court subjugate autonomy principles,
but also risked the integrity of the attorney-client relationship,
infringed upon an individual's ability to choose counsel, and put
confidential communications in jeopardy of disclosure. In addition
to this disregard of fairness issues, these expansions of the doctrine's
scope actually defeated the goals of judicial economy and efficiency
that they had aimed to protect.
Finally, in 1997, the court took an encouraging step and began
to re-prioritize the underlying goals of the entire controversy
doctrine. With the decision in Olds, as well as its companion cases,
the New Jersey Supreme Court signaled that it was once again ready
to place a great deal of significance on fairness concerns. 280 By
removing legal malpractice claims from the scope of the doctrine, the
court recognized that the doctrine had been adopted both to
promote judicial economy and fairness to individual litigants. The
decision was a much-needed shift from the court's position of placing
unwavering importance on judicial efficiency with disregard of the
collateral consequences.
Moreover, the decision signified a
recognition that the doctrine was not effectively accomplishing its
underlying goals.
The culmination of this re-prioritization is embodied in the 1998
Amendments to the New Jersey Court Rules. 281' The structure of the

entire controversy doctrine after these amendments represents
possibly the best balance between the goals of effectuating judicial
economy and complete adjudication and of promoting fairness. The
new rules do not go so far as to allow litigants the autonomy they
experienced in the pre-Cogdell days, during which the doctrine was

(1989).
279
See, e.g., Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 142 N.J.
336, 344-45, 662 A.2d 536, 540-41 (1995); Mystic Isle Dev. Corp. v. Perskie &
Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310, 331-32, 662 A.2d 523, 534 (1995); Circle Chevrolet Co. v.
Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 291, 662 A.2d 509, 514 (1995); Ditrolio v.
Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267-68, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (1995).
280
See, e.g., Harley Davidson Motor Co. v. Advance Die Casting, Inc., 150 N.J. 489,
496-97, 696 A.2d 666, 670 (1997); Donohue v. Kuhn, 150 N.J. 484, 488, 696 A.2d 664,
666 (1997); Karpovich v. Barbarula, 150 NJ. 473, 480, 696 A.2d 659, 662 (1997);
Olds, 150 N.J. at 446-47, 696 A.2d at 645.
281 See generally 1998 Amendments to the New Jersey Court Rules, supra
note 8.
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little more than resjudicata. On the other hand, the new application
does not impose a blanket party-joinder rule that allows for no
flexibility in dealing with individual cases.
The new rules accomplish this effective balance through several
key changes to the doctrine. First, the removal of the mandatory
party-joinder rule creates a far more flexible procedural system that
emphasizes fairness issues, such as party autonomy. 82 The new rule
allows litigants to structure their lawsuits in the manner that they
believe is strategically most efficient and offers the highest likelihood
of success. Furthermore, because individual suits will be less complex
and will involve fewer parties, the litigation costs and time burdens
placed on litigants is lessened. The ability of litigants to fragment
litigation are also controlled by the claim joinder requirements that
have been retained by the doctrine. Moreover, the other changes to
the doctrine significantly restrict a litigant's ability to unnecessarily
segment proceedings.
Second, the amendment to Rule 4:5-1 (b) (2) requiring
notification of all related parties helps accomplish both the goal of
facilitating fairness to nonparties and the goal of effectuating judicial
efficiency.2 The fairness to nonparties will be served in that those
individuals with an interest in the litigation will usually be given
notice of and an opportunity to intervene into that proceeding.
Thus, those parties are able to determine if the particular suit will
affect their interests in such a way that they should join. The rule
requires, however, that trial courts, in all but the most extreme cases,
respect the decision of the nonparties who choose not to intervene. 2m
The notification aspect will facilitate judicial efficiency by providing
trial courts with the identity of all parties related to a particular
controversy. As Justice Pollock stated in Olds, this will allow judges to
better determine how to manage a particular litigation.l As a result,
litigants who decide deliberately to fragment a controversy will be
required to notify the court of that intention. Furthermore, Rule 4:51 (b) (2) notification will facilitate the trial court's use of Rule 4:291(b) joinder power.28 6 Along with the amendment to Rule 4:29-1 (b),
this notification requirement is one of the major changes that strikes
the balance between serving fairness and achieving judicial efficiency.
Absent these two rules, the doctrine would revert to its pre-Cogdell
282
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See PRESSLER, N.J. CURRENT COURT RULES, R. 4:30A (GANN 1999).
SeePRESSLER, R. 4:5-1 (b) (2) (GANN 1999).
See PRESSLER, R. 4:5-1(b) (2) cmt. (GANN 1999).

See Olds, 150 N.J. at 447, 696 A.2d at 645.
See PRESSLER, R. 4:29-1(b) cmt. (GANN 1999).
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form and permit litigants to segment proceedings with little threat of
judicial intervention. Judicial efficiency is also reinforced by Rule
4:5(b) (1)'s grant of preclusionary power for violation of the
notification duty. Although only permitted in extreme cases, the
threat of preclusion of a subsequent suit will help to ensure that
litigants fully comply with their duties.
Finally, the joinder power granted to trial courts in Rule 4:291 (b) is the principal means by which the recent amendments to the
New Jersey Court Rules promote judicial efficiency. By allowing trial
courts the discretionary power to order the joinder of additional
parties in certain circumstances, this rule will avoid the most
egregious and blatant examples of piecemeal litigation. Although
joinder decisions will usually be left to the parties and interested
nonparties, trial judges are given the opportunity to exercise their
judgment and determine when a particular party must be joined,
despite both the wishes of the particular nonparties and the wishes of
the named parties.
This discretionary procedure permits the
doctrine's party-joinder requirements to be exercised on a case-bycase basis to better suit the needs of each particular circumstance.
Significantly, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in drafting Rule 4:291 (b) (2), has made it clear that thisjoinder power is to be used only in
unique circumstances. 287 This particular language, which requires
that the interest of the litigants be outweighed by the interests of
judicial economy, emphasizes the balance the new rules are striving
to achieve.
Overall, the 1998 amendments develop the doctrine into an
application that seems more flexible and better equipped to handle
the circumstances of each particular case. While critics may argue
that the revisions should have removed all traces of the party-joinder
requirements, the small pieces that remain will help accomplish the
doctrine's ultimate dual mission of efficiency and fairness. The only
threat lies in the possibility that courts will begin to expansively
interpret the vague joinder and preclusion language of the new rules
and liberally apply those powers in a variety of settings. Such action
would once again create the adverse effects of the former doctrine,
but would magnify them by applying them in random instances.
However, in light of the NewJersey Supreme Court's emphasis on the
failings of the former application, this seems unlikely to occur. The
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See id.

360

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

result is a new entire controversy doctrine that, although susceptible
to judicial abuse, is suited to accomplish its underlying goals.
John A. Boyle

